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ABSTRACT 
 
Before the most important refugee crisis seen in years, the States of the World had to 
mobilize and take action. Though the worst part took place in the Middle East, affecting 
Syria, Palestine, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey, Lebanon, and many other countries, a 
high number of refugees tried to seek protection in Europe. 
Due the big mass influx coming into the European territory, most of it through Turkey, 
and the recent terrorist attacks, Europe had to take some measures like the “EU-Turkey 
Statement” of 18th March 2016 to tackle irregular migration and prevent the entrance of 
smugglers and terrorists. 
Even though, the EU-Turkey Statement has been severely criticized on account of the 
consequences of its application. For this reason this research aims to analyse the 
International and European system in relation to the refugee conditions and the Statement 
as such, and conclude whether it complies with the legal standards or, otherwise, if it has 
been a failure. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In 2011 demonstrations and riots known as the Arab Spring took place in in North Africa 
and Middle East aimed to achieve reforms. This movement began in Tunisia and rapidly 
spread to Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya and Syria, with the goal of bringing new 
governments and throw authoritarian leaders away from the power. The results were 
violent responses from the authorities. More specifically, the conflict in Syria started 
when 15 boys were detained and tortured for writing graffiti in support of the Arab Spring. 
While peaceful protest raised in response, President Bashar al-Assad took action by 
killing hundreds of demonstrators and imprisoning others.  
On the one hand, rebel groups aiming at overthrowing the government were created (as 
the Free Syrian Army, the Islamic Front, and 70 other groups, all called “the opposition”). 
On the other hand, some sectarian divisions were created due to the fact that the Syrian 
population is composed of a majority of Sunni Muslims and a minority of Shia Muslims 
(e.g. the Syrian government is predominantly Alawite— a Shia sect representing less than 
15% of the population).  
Nowadays, the conflict is still going on and has been worsened by the action taken by 
third actors. Iran, China and Russia are supporting the Syrian government whilst some 
Sunni States in the Middle East, France, UK, Turkey and the US also supported “the 
opposition”. Further complicating the scenario, Islamic radical groups also took action: 
Al-Nusra and ISIS (the Islamic State coming from the Al-Qaeda of Iraq and known by 
their brutal atrocities). They aim to spread an Islamic emirate in Syria and Iraq and are 
considered by a high number of countries as terrorist groups. 
Because of the armed conflict and all the States and groups participating in it, more than 
4.8 million people were forced to flee the country, and other 8.7 million are internally 
displaced inside Syria. While Lebanon (around 1 million Syrian refugees), Jordan 
(655.675 Syrian refugees), Iraq (3.1 million displaced and 228.894 Syrian refugees), 
Egypt (115.204 Syrian refugees) and Turkey (2.7 million Syrian refugees) have struggled 
to cope with one of the largest refugee exoduses, only about 10% of Syrian refugees have 
sought protection in Europe. 
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European Union and its Member States have tried to solve the problem of migrants and 
refugees inflows coming to Europe from the Middle East through Turkey and Greece1. 
Latest attempts in this regard are represented by the 2015 European Union-Turkey Action 
Plan and the 2016 Statement of the European Union and Turkey2 which contained 
measures aimed to control the irregular migration. 
My aim with this research is to conclude whether the EU-Turkey Statement complies with 
the European and International standards and, moreover, to see if the efforts of the 
European Union were worth it and the goals settled achieved. 
To obtain these goals I will first analyse which the international Legislation is relating to 
the refugee condition. Secondly I will analyse the European framework, the Council of 
Europe work on the matter as an International Organisation (IO) and briefly treat the 
matter of the borders control, as it is related to the EU-Turkey Statement3.  
Once the overall panorama has become clear, the core analysis of this paper will consist 
in the analysis of the most criticized concepts of the Statement, and other relevant aspects 
of it. For example, I want to talk about the lack of conceptual distinction between 
migrants, refugees and irregular migrants made by the Statement contracting parties, or 
the fact that some countries closed their internal borders before the crisis. 
The asylum law system in Turkey and Greece will also be analysed to determine whether 
they are appropriate in accordance to European and International legal standards, the no-
so clear concepts of “safe third country” and “first country of asylum”, the principle of 
non-refoulement, and the differences between resettlement and relocation. Furthermore, 
I will contrast the facts with information provided by Amnesty International and other IO 
or NGO’s to compare and be able to strengthen my conclusions. 
Finally I will analyse the legal structure and nature of the Statement to compare it to those 
European and International standards. 
In essence, I aim to clarify which was the real intention of the European Union when it 
embodied it, which were the consequences, and therefore, if it was a failure or a success. 
                                                     
1 See “Annex II: The Balkan Route used by refugees, pre-March 2016” 
2 See “Annex I: The EU-Turkey Statement, 18th of March 2016 to tackle irregular migration” 
3 See “Annex III:  Legal framework timeline” 
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2018 
8 
 
 
2. INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1. 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 New York Protocol 
The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Geneva Convention) contains 
three types of provisions: provisions defining who is and who is not a refugee and who 
has ceased to be one4; provisions describing the legal status of refugees, their rights and 
duties in the country of refuge5; and provisions relating to the implementation of the 
convention6.  
According to the Convention the term “refugee” applies to any person who is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of 
that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
habitual residence as a result of such event, is unable or fearing to return to it. 
The reasons that may lead to consider a person a “refugee” are covered in Article 1A(2) 
(e.g. race, religion, nationality, social exclusion or political opinion). Later legislation—
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967 New York Protocol) — removed time 
and geographical limitations thus extending the coverage of “refugee” beyond the ones 
imposed by the Convention, namely the ones in Articles 1A(2) and 1B(1)(a)7. 
Articles 1C(1) to (6) and 1D, E and F of the Convention define “cessation” and 
“exclusion” clauses, establishing when the a refugee ceases to be one and which refugees 
shall not receive protection or assistance from organisms of the United Nations other than 
the UNHCR.  
More articles include provisions on the personal status of a refugee, the refugees’ 
property, access to courts, employment, housing, public education, social security, 
freedom of movement, identity and travel documents and irregular presence in the country 
of refuge.  
                                                     
4 Chapter I of the Geneva Convention 
5 Chapters II-V of the Geneva Convention 
6 Chapters VI-VII of the Geneva Convention 
7 1967 New York Protocol, Art. 1(2),(3). 
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One provision deserves special attention as it lies at the core of the refugee protection: 
the so-called principle of non-refoulement [Art. 33(1)], which is part of the customary 
international law8 and is binding on all States, regardless of whether the Contracting 
States adhered to the 1951 Geneva Convention or not. According to this principle no 
government shall not expel or return a person back to persecutions. 
However the procedures aiming to recognize the refugee status are not established neither 
in the 1951 Geneva Convention nor in the 1967 New York Protocol. It is for the Member 
States to define and enforce the legislation dealing with these situations.  
2.2. 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
The Declaration is not, in itself, a legally binding instrument. Nonetheless it contains a 
series of principles and rights that are based on human rights standards enshrined in other 
international binding instruments– such as the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. Furthermore the Declaration was agreed by the General Assembly and 
therefore represents a very strong commitment to its implementation in each State. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), in its Article 14, establishes that: 
(1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from 
persecution.   
(2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from 
non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations. 
Nonetheless, we cannot say that the UDHR establishes an individual right to the asylum 
applicant because the article does only contemplate the possibility to seek and enjoy 
asylum but not the obligation to grant it or the right to obtain it.  
In other words, it makes emphasis on the right of anyone who’s been persecuted but 
eludes the most important part: the recognition of the right to asylum. From here it 
                                                     
8 UNHCR. UN High Commissioner for Refugees. The Principle of Non-Refoulement as a Norm of 
Customary International Law. Response to the Questions Posed to UNHCR by the Federal Constitutional 
Court of the Federal Republic of Germany in Cases 2 BvR 1938/93, 2 BvR 1953/93, 2 BvR 1954/93. 31 
January 1994. Available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/437b6db64.html [14 February 2018] 
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emerges that asylum is not a human right, it is a prerogative of each State to decide about 
the recognition of the concession instead9.  
3. EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK 
The EU has evolved from three international organisations established in the 1950s in the 
field of energy, security and free trade, known as the European Communities10. The 
essential purpose of the European Communities (EC) was the economic development 
through the circulation of goods, capital, people and services. Hence the free movement 
of people is a basic element of the EU.  
Since 1994, nationals of third States that do not belong to the EU but to the European 
Economic Area (EEA) such as Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway11, can enjoy the same 
rights of freedom of movement as the nationals of the EU. Turkish citizens who accessed 
to the EU to work and settle in a Member State have also certain privileges like the right 
to stay and the protection against expulsion12. 
The asylum legislation in the EU has evolved incessantly since then. 
3.1. Before the Treaty on European Union  
a. 1957 Treaty of Rome 
The Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community (EEC) and brought 
together 6 countries (Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands) to work towards integration and economic growth through trade. It created 
a common market based on the free movement of goods, people, services and capital. 
                                                     
9 MARTÍN ARRIBAS, JUAN JOSÉ, Los Estados Europeos frente al desafío de los refugiados y el derecho 
de asilo. Universidad de Burgos. 2000, p.102. 
10 Also known as: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy 
Community (EAEC or Euratom), and the European Economic Community (EEC) 
11 Agreement on the European Economic Area, 2 May 1992, Part III, Free Movement of persons, services 
and capital, Official Journey n° L 001 de 03/01/1994 p. 0003 - 0036 
12 1963 Agreement Creating An Association Between The Republic of Turkey and the European Economic 
Community (Ankara Agreement) and the 1970 Additional protocols. 
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However, during the 70s, the Member States started developing intergovernmental 
cooperation to fight against the problems related to Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), 
among them the refugees and the asylum problems. 
b. 1985 Single European Act 
The Single European Act (SEA) was signed in Luxembourg on 17th February 1986 and 
entered into force on 1st July 1987.  
One of the goals of the SEA was to establish progressively an internal market without 
internal borders for free movement of persons, capital, goods and services. This implied 
the removal of the internal borders between Member States (MS) whilst maintaining the 
external frontiers and applying a common legislation to those MS trying to adapt the 
national law to that “common legislation”13. The attempt was not successful but some 
groups, like the ad hoc group on immigration, focused on obliterating the common 
borders and strengthening the exterior ones. The Ad-Hoc group on immigration created 
the Dublin convention. 
3.2. After the Treaty on European Union 
c. 1985 Schengen Agreement and the 1990 Schengen Implementation Convention14 
The Schengen Agreement is an agreement between the governments of some States – the 
Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic— 
about the abolition of checks on persons crossing a land border between two of those 
countries. The five original signatory States decided to create a territory without checks 
at the internal borders known as the “Schengen area”. Nowadays all EU MS, except UK 
and Ireland, are members of the Schengen area. Some non-EU members (Norway, 
Switzerland and Iceland) have been associated to the implementation. 
                                                     
13 MARTÍN ARRIBAS, op cit., p.116. 
14 European Union, Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the 
Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
French Republic, on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders ("Schengen 
Implementation Agreement"), 19 June 1990.  
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In relation with asylum applications, asylum seekers can apply for protection at the border 
crossing points or within the territory of the Member States15. The border crossing points 
are the external land borders, the international airports and seaports of the Member States. 
d. 1990 Dublin Convention 
The Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum 
(the Dublin Convention) was signed in 1990 and entered into force in 1997.  
Some of the main objectives of the Dublin Convention—laid down in the Preamble— are 
the following ones: 
- To guarantee adequate protection to refugees in accordance with the terms of the 
Geneva Convention of 28thJuly 1951, as amended by the 1976 New York 
Protocol; 
- To take measures to avoid that applicants for asylum are left in doubt for too long 
as regards the likely outcome of their applications, and to ensure that all applicants 
applications will be examined by one of the Member States; 
- To guarantee that applicants are not referred successively from one Member State 
to another without any of these States acknowledging itself to be competent to 
examine the application for asylum; 
The procedure towards determining the Member State responsible for examining the 
application for asylum under the Dublin Convention should start as soon as an application 
for asylum is first lodged with a Member State. That application must be examined by the 
State in accordance with its national laws and its international obligations. A 
computerised system to collect data and fingerprints of asylum seekers (Eurodac) was 
also established in accordance with the 1990 Dublin Convention to establish the identity 
of applicants. 
                                                     
15 Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member 
States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, Art. 3. 
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However, the convention itself did not provide any obligation to recognise asylum 
decisions of the other Contracting Parties, and is only applied when the asylum seeker 
cannot be sent back to a safe country16.  
e. 1993 Maastricht Treaty 
The Maastricht Treaty, which entered into force in 1993, introduces the concept of 
citizenship of the Union, although it is based on the possession of the citizenship of one 
of the EU Member States. This concept has been widely applied to support the free 
movement of citizens and members of their families of any nationality. 
This Treaty introduced the pillar structure, where the EC (the EEC, the ECSC and the 
EURATOM) is known as the first pillar. The second pillar comprises the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the third pillar under the Maastricht Treaty are 
the policies on Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).  
f. 1999 Amsterdam Treaty  
It was signed on the 2nd October 1997 and entered into force on the 1st May 1999, and the 
main feature is that the subject matter of asylum, among others, was transferred from the 
third to the first pillar. 
The Amsterdam Treaty also introduced the concept of “area of freedom, security and 
justice”, which is essential for the development of the Common European Asylum 
System, because it is based on the idea that the EU is an area where people in need of 
international protection can seek refuge17.  
g. 2001 Treaty of Nice 
The main purpose of the 2001 Treaty of Nice was to adapt the institutions to accommodate 
the future enlargement of the EU to twelve new Member States. It also gave more powers 
to the European Parliament, notably through extending to new areas its right of co-
                                                     
16 FERGUSON SIDORENKO, OLGA. The Common European Asylum System. Background, current state 
of affairs, future direction. T.M.C. ASSER PRESS, The Hague, 2007, p. 18. 
17 FERGUSON SIDORENKO, op cit., p. 20.  
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deciding legislative Acts with the Council, and by making this right a real co-decision by 
conferring the same deciding power on the European Parliament as that of the Council18. 
3.3. 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 
Proclaimed in year 2000, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (hereinafter the 
Charter) was a simple "declaration" not legally binding. Nevertheless, when the Treaty of 
Lisbon entered into force on 1st January 2009, the Charter, which became legally binding, 
was altered19. In this way, the EU institutions (and the Member States) are required to 
respect the Charter in the process of applying EU Law (Article 51 of the Charter). 
Article 18 of the Charter includes, for the first time at the European level, the right of 
asylum. In accordance with its article 18, it is a qualified right: ‹‹ […] guarantees the right 
of asylum in compliance with the norms of the Geneva Convention [...] and in accordance 
with the Treaty of the European Union and with the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union [...] ». Article 19 of the Charter prohibits the return of a person to a 
situation of justified fear of persecution or of a real risk of torture, inhuman treatment or 
punishment or degrading (“non-refoulement” principle). 
In addition, Article 47 of the Charter establishes the right to effective judicial protection 
and the right of a fair trial, which also includes the possibility to access to legal aid if lack 
of sufficient resources. On another hand, Article 52 of the Charter stipulates that the 
minimum protection contemplated in the provisions are in accordance with the ECHR; 
however, this provision shall not prevent Union law of providing more extensive 
protection. 
4. COUNCIL OF EUROPE 
4.1. 1953 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms  
                                                     
18 PIRIS, JEAN-CLAUDE. The Lisbon Treaty, a legal and political analysis. United States of America, by 
Cambridge University Press, New York, 2010, p.9. 
19 SALOME SY SARAH. European Parliament At your service. Fact Sheets on the European Union. The 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. March 2018. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_4.1.2.html [11 May 2018] 
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With the purpose to promote the Rule of Law, democracy and human rights, the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was adopted in 1950. Moreover, the European 
Court on Human Rights (ECtHR) was established under Article 19 of the ECHR to ensure 
compliance by States with the obligations imposed on them by the Convention20.  
The ECHR only contains certain provisions in which foreigners are explicitly mentioned. 
For example, Article 2 of the Protocol no. 4 of the ECHR establishes that everyone 
lawfully within the territory of a State will have the right to liberty of movement and 
freedom to choose his residence or to leave any country, and no restrictions will be placed 
on the exercise of these rights other than the ones in accordance with Law. Article 3 and 
4 settles some prohibitions, such as the prohibition of expulsion of nationals whereby no 
one will be expelled or deprived to enter the territory of the State of which he is a national, 
and the prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens.  
In article 1 of Protocol no.7 to the ECHR— Protocol amended by Protocol No.11— we 
see some procedural safeguards relating to expulsion of aliens, which can only be 
expelled in the interests of public order or grounded reasons of national security and will 
be allowed to submit reasons against his expulsion, to have his case reviewed, and to be 
represented for these purposes before the competent authority.  
4.2. 1989 Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 
This Convention was established in regard of the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and more specifically its article 3: "no one shall be 
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment".  
Furthermore, the Member States of the Council of Europe established a European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment. This Committee can examine the treatment of persons deprived of their 
                                                     
20 EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS and COUNCIL OF EUROPE. 
Handbook on European law relating to asylum, borders and immigration. 2015, pp. 15-16. Available at:  
http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2013/handbook-european-law-relating-asylum-borders-and-
immigration [14 February 2018] 
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liberty by “non-judicial means of a preventive character” 21 based on visits, and each Party 
would have to permit it. 
4.3. 1960 European Convention on Extradition 
The European Convention on Extradition is a multilateral extradition treaty drawn up in 
1957 by the Member States of the Council of Europe.  
Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between 
its Members States, with this Agreement the extradition is granted if an offence– 
punishable under the laws of the requesting Party and of the requested Party— has 
committed by deprivation of liberty or under a detention order for a maximum period of 
at least one year or by a more severe penalty.  
4.4. 1960 European Agreement on the Abolition of Visas for Refugees  
The Agreement aims to facilitate the travel for refugees residing in the territory of one of 
the Contracting Parties. To this end, it provides that refugees may enter without visas on 
the territory of all Parties within a maximum of 3 months, but for a longer stay or for the 
purpose of taking gainful employment, a visa will be required.  
Moreover, refugees who have entered the territory of a Contracting Party— under the 
standards of this Agreement— have to be re-admitted at any time to the territory of the 
Contracting Party by whose authorities the travel document was issued.  
5. ASYLUM POLICY IN EUROPE: CEAS 
Since 1999, the European Union have been working on the creation of a Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS), where a new legislation settles several rules and 
strengthens the cooperation procedures to grant equal treatment to asylum seekers. 
The aim of CEAS is to make easier the access to asylum to those people in need of 
protection, to grant the non-refoulement of those under persecution and offer fair 
conditions to asylum seekers and to the beneficiaries of international protection. In this 
                                                     
21 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, “European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment”, Strasbourg, 26.XI.1987. 
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context the European Union adopted several Directives and Resolutions in order to 
comply with the collective duty of the Member States to welcome refugees22.  
5.1. Asylum Procedures Directive 
The Asylum Procedures Directive23  tires to build a system to grant the adoption of fairer 
decisions and the revision of the applications for all Member States under common 
criteria:  
- Clearer rules for the applicants to ensure efficiency in the borders when asylum 
requests are made; 
- Speed up the procedures up to 6 months, also trying to assist the applicants, namely 
those with special needs; 
- Clarifies the rules for judicial appeal in an attempt to reduce the pressure above 
Strasbourg Court. 
5.2. Reception Conditions Directive 
This Directive24 established the conditions of the reception while the applicants are 
waiting for the assessment of their application. It allows the access to accommodation, 
food, health assistance and work, also psychological assistance if necessary. 
The new Directive25 about reception conditions tries to ensure a common regulation 
harmonized in the EU. It also settles common dispositions about the detention of the 
asylum seekers with the aim to protect their fundamental rights; including a list of reasons 
for detention: it prohibits the arbitrary detention, restricts the detention of vulnerable 
people as minors, guarantees free legal assistance, and grants specific conditions for those 
under detention (as the access to IGO’s and their relatives). 
                                                     
22 Comisión Europea. Un Sistema Europeo Común de Asilo. Asuntos de Interior. Luxemburgo. 2014. 
23 Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member 
States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, recast by the Directive 2013/31/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 of June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing 
international protection 
24 Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of 
asylum seekers. 
25 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 of June 2013 on common 
procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast) 
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2018 
18 
 
5.3.Directive on minimum standards 
The Directive on minimum standards26 specified the reasons for the concession of 
international protection and some protection rights against devolution, residence permits, 
travel documents, employment access and education, social protection, health assistance, 
integration instruments, and specific provisions for vulnerable people. 
The recasted Directive27 has the aim to improve the quality of the decision process and 
grant the fair and equal treatment for the persecuted: 
- It aims to clarify the motives of the concession of protection to achieve more solid 
decisions; 
- Ensures the interest of the minors and gender aspects in the evaluation of the asylum 
request during the application of the rules of international protection; 
- It improves the access to the integration measures; 
- It introduces common criteria for applicants of international protection to be 
recognised as eligible for ‘subsidiary protection’, meaning that a third-country 
national or stateless person who do not qualify as a refugee, faces a real risk of 
suffering serious harm if returned to their country of origin. 
5.4. Dublin Resolution 
The core of this Regulation28 is that the responsibility of examining the requests is for 
the Member State that has played the most important role during the entrance or the 
residence of the applicant in the EU. The criteria used to determine the responsibility 
is, in hierarchical order: from family considerations, to recent possession of visa or 
residence permit in a Member State, to whether the applicant has entered the EU 
irregularly or regularly.  
                                                     
26 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status 
of third-country nationals and stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international 
protection and the content of the protection granted. 
27 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards 
for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international 
protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the 
content of the protection granted (recast) 
28 Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the 
Member States by a third-country national 
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2018 
19 
 
The new Regulation29 contains more reliable protection procedures for the asylum 
applicants and increases the efficiency of the system by: 
- Creating provisions for the protection of the needed, as a compulsory personal 
interview, guarantees for the minors, and an extension of the possibilities for 
familiar reunification. 
- The possibility to suspend the transfer because an appealing— linked to the grant 
of the right to everybody to stay in the territory— while the Court decides about the 
suspension of the transfer during the appealing. Moreover, it grants the right to 
appeal against a transfer decision; 
- The obligation to give free legal assistance to whoever demands it; 
- A single ground for detention in case of risk of absconding; 
- The opportunity to those who might been considered irregular migrants and might 
be returned to the place they come from, to be protected in the Dublin procedure 
(major protection than the Returning Directive30); 
- Increasing clarity of the procedure: the Dublin procedure cannot be longer than 11 
months if it is related to the shelter of the persons, or 9 months if the result is to 
return them to the place they came from. 
5.5. Eurodac31 
The new Regulation32 improves the regular functioning of the Eurodac: 
- New periods for transmission of fingerprints information to the Eurodac Central Unit 
are fixed; 
- Total compatibility with the newest legislation relating asylum and data protection is 
ensured; 
                                                     
29 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 of June establishing 
the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application 
for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless 
person (recast) 
30 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common 
standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals. 
31 Council Regulation (EC) No 2725/2000 of 11 December 2000 concerning the establishment of 'Eurodac' 
for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention 
32 Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 establishing Eurodac for the comparison of asylum applicants' 
fingerprints, for better application of the Regulation (EU) No 604/2013. 
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- The use of the Eurodac information for national police and Europol is permitted only 
as a last resource to compare the fingerprints with criminal investigations and always 
with the aim to prevent, detect, and investigate major crimes and terrorism. 
6. BORDERS CONTROL 
The Schengen acquis, applied in most EU Member States, establishes a unified system 
for maintaining external border controls but allowing EU individuals to travel freely 
across borders within the Schengen area. However, Article 6 of the Schengen Borders 
Code (Regulation (EC) No. 562/2006) prohibits the application of the code in a way that 
allows refoulement or unlawful discrimination33.  
As a general rule, States have a sovereign right to control the entry of non-nationals in 
their territory, but the EU has set up rules to prevent irregular entry as the EU agency 
Frontex34, created in 2004 to support EU Member States in the management of external 
EU borders. The agency also provides operational support through joint operations at 
land, air or sea borders. Besides, Member States can request Frontex to deploy a rapid 
intervention system known as Rapid Border Intervention Team (RABIT) consisting to 
allow, in case of exceptional migratory pressure, rapid deployment of border guards on a 
European level. 
Later, in 2013, the Eurosur Regulation established a European border surveillance 
system35 necessary to strengthen the exchange of information and the operational 
cooperation between national authorities of Member States. Eurosur provides national 
authorities with the necessary mechanisms to improve their reaction capability at the 
external borders, aiming to detect and prevent illegal immigration, cross-border crime and 
to reinforce the protection of migrants. 
As the access to the EU territory may be also by sea, the 1974 International Convention 
for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the 1979 International Convention on maritime 
                                                     
33 EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY and COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Handbook on European law. Op cit., pp. 
25-40. 
34 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for 
the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European 
Union, amended by the Regulation (EU) No. 1168/2011. 
35 REGULATION (EU) No 1052/2013 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur) 
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Search and Rescue (SAR) contain the duty to assist and rescue persons in danger. It is 
always been controversial where rescued persons should be disembarked, but latest case 
was when a rescue ship of Open Arms was seized because the captain and the head of the 
mission refused to deliver 218 migrants rescued at sea to the Libyan Coast Guard36.  
7. THE EU-TURKEY STATEMENT: DE JURE AND DE FACTO 
7.1. Concept of migrants, refugees and irregular migrants.  
The EU-Turkey Statement (hereinafter the Statement) aims to address the overwhelming 
flow of smuggled migrants traveling across the Aegean from Turkey to the Greek islands 
by allowing Greece to return to Turkey “all new irregular migrants” arriving after March 
2016.  
Although the scope of the agreement is irregular migration, it implicitly affects people 
that could be considered refugees and thus it raises several issues regarding its 
compatibility with the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.  
The significant element of the refugee’s legal status under the Geneva Convention is the 
lack of protection they receive from their own country, but refugees must not be 
considered just migrants as they are forced to leave their country. At most, they may be 
considered subjects of forced migration. 
Moreover, Article 31 of the Geneva Convention provides special guarantees for the 
refugees being unlawfully in the country of refuge, including the prohibition to impose 
criminal penalties and apply restrictions to their right of movement. Consequently, 
Member States have special negative obligations regarding refugees and, in many cases, 
the entry on the territory of the State of the person seeking international protection from 
a foreign State is achieved through illegal means37.  
In essence, the Agreement lacks precision and it should not have ignored the differences 
between the term “refugee”, “migrant” and “irregular migrant”. In addition, since it did 
not established a difference between these categories of persons, it might be provoked the 
                                                     
36 For more information of the case: OPEN MIGRATION website, www.openmigration.org; and the Italian 
Guard Coast Comunicato stampa 16 marzo 2018: www.guardiacostiera.gov.it  
37 MOLDOVAN Carmen. Is the EU-Turkey Action Plan an effective or just an apparent solution to the 
refugee crisis? Romania. 2017. Available at: 
http://www.ceswp.uaic.ro/articles/CESWP2017_IX3_MOL.pdf [April 2018] 
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effect of excluding those in need of protection and Member States could have ignored 
responsibilities towards them.  
7.2. Borders closure 
As said before, the Schengen Borders Code stablished in its Article 3 the obligation to 
apply such Code without prejudice of the rights of refugees and persons requesting 
international protection, in particular as regards non-refoulement. In May 2016— two 
months after the Agreement was signed— the war already did forced the migration of 
4,843,285 refugees38. Nonetheless, some European States closed their borders alleging 
Article 25 of the Schengen Borders Code39, which allows the reestablishment of the 
borders within the Schengen Area, and Article 26, pleading that the mass influx of 
refugees implied a threat to public policy and internal security.  
Because these articles allowed the reintroduction of border controls, Hungary built a 
razor-wire barrier on its border with Serbia; also it did Croatia after 3,000 migrants and 
refugees crossed into the country in one day; Austria, erecting a four-kilometre-long 
fence at the Slovenian border and deploying armed forces around the border; or 
Macedonia and Slovenia, who announced that they were not going to let migrants and 
refugees through their borders with Greece. 
The measures undertaken by States for the prevention of illegal migration via restrictive 
rules when admitting foreigners –or even closing borders— may have as legitimate 
objective the protection of the rights of its own citizens, public order and security of the 
territory. However, their legitimacy should be in relation with irregular migrants and 
smugglers, but not with persons claiming international protection and refugee status.  
7.3. The Asylum Law in Turkey 
                                                     
38 CEAR: Comisión Española de Ayuda al Refugiado. Las personas refugiadas en España y Europa. 
Madrid. Informe del 2016. Available at: https://www.cear.es/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/Informe_CEAR_2016.pdf [8 March 2018] 
39 GUILD ELSPETH, BROUWER EVELIEN, GRONENDIJK KEES and CARRERA SERGIO from 
Societal Security Network. What is happening to the Schengen borders? CEPS Paper in Liberty and 
Security in Europe. No. 86/December 2015. p. 10-11. Available at: 
https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/No%2086%20Schengenland_0.pdf [May 2018] 
 
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2018 
23 
 
Firstly, Turkey hosts a high number of refugees from Syria, but also a high number 
of asylum seekers of other nationalities –Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran and Somalia, among 
others40. As we see, even if all of them are from non-European States in of seek protection, 
they have been differentiated in two groups (Syrian in one hand, and the others on the 
other hand) and they are also under two different sets of asylum rules and procedures (as 
we will next). 
Turkey’s asylum law, the Law on Foreigners and International Protection from 2014 
(LFIP), completely reformed the country’s legal framework for migration matters and 
established a new civilian agency called the Directorate General for Migration 
Management (DGMM), which is in charge of managing asylum and migration in Turkey. 
Nonetheless, the LFIP maintained the geographical limitation for the condition of 
refugees to those “persons who have become refugees as a result of events occurring in 
Europe”41.  
The LFIP has two main parts: the section on “Foreigners” and the section on 
“International Protection”. The International Protection section determine 4 categories of 
protection: 
- “Refugees” are those who fled their country because of events in Europe, and 
“shall be granted refugee status upon completion of the refugee status 
determination process” (art. 61. LFIP); 
- “Conditional refugee” are those who fled because of events from outside Europe, 
and “shall be allowed to reside in Turkey temporarily until they are resettled to a 
third country” (art. 62 LFIP);  
- “Subsidiary protection beneficiary” are beneficiaries who do not “qualify as 
refugees nor as a conditional refugee” but shall “nevertheless be granted subsidiary 
protection upon the status determination because if returned to the country of origin 
or country of habitual residence” would face death, execution, torture, inhuman 
treatment, etc. (art. 63. LFIP) 
                                                     
40 RSN. Refugee Solidarity Network. Refugees and Asylum in Turkey. Available at: 
https://www.refugeesolidaritynetwork.org/about-refugees-in-turkey/ [May 2018]  
41 Article 61. Part Three “International Protection” of the Law No. 6458 of 2013 on Foreigners and 
International Protection [Turkey], 4 April 2013. 
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- “Temporary protection” is the protected legal status for Syrians in Turkey (art. 
91.1. LFIP and the Provisional Article 1 of the Temporary Protection Regulation, 
Turkey, 22 October 2014 [TPR]). “Temporary protection may be provided for 
foreigners who have been forced to leave their country, cannot return to the country 
that they have left, and have arrived at or crossed the borders of Turkey in a mass 
influx situation seeking immediate and temporary protection”. 
Unlike the status of “refugee” or “conditional refugee”, temporary protection does not 
allow for the possibility of resettlement under the LFIP. In 2015, the UNHCR stated that 
resettlement is not a right as such42 and, besides, the UNHCR Turkey Fact Sheet of 
October 2017, also established that resettlement is based on a rigorous prioritization of 
cases with the most acute vulnerabilities or protection risks.  
Therefore, the Turkish “temporary protection” concept represents a group-based system 
for immediate protection but does not determine a procedure for a durable solution. This 
is because the TPR neither sets a duration of the temporary protection status (Art. 10 of 
the TPR) nor guarantees access to the individual “international protection” procedure for 
the ones who seek a future termination of that “temporary protection” regime43. As a 
further matter, Article 16 of the TPR stablishes that “individual international protection 
applications filed by foreigners under this regulation shall not be processed in order to 
ensure the effective implementation of temporary protection measures during the period 
of the implementation of temporary protection”.  
After the reading of this articles, the conclusion we can get is that ineligible for 
resettlement, unable to apply for international protection and being not possible to return 
to Syria, those in need of protection remain in limbo44. 
                                                     
42 UNHCR document. Frequently Asked Questions About Syrian Refugees in Turkey: “It is a last resort 
solution for the most vulnerable refugees”. 2015. p. 8. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/tr/wp-
content/uploads/sites/14/2017/02/frequently_asked_questions.pdf [May 2018] 
43 Art. 3.f) TPR: “Protection status granted to foreigners , who were forced to leave their countries and are 
unable to return to the countries they left and arrived at or crossed our borders in masses to seek urgent and 
temporary protection and whose international protection requests cannot be taken under individual 
assessment”, and; Art. 3.ö) TPR: “International protection: The status granted for refugee, conditional 
refugee, and subsidiary protection”  
44 DROMGOLD MICHELLE. Migration Policy and Migration Management of Syrians in Turkey.  Turkish 
Migration Conference 2015 Selected Proceedings; co-edited by Guven Seker, Ali Tilbe, Mustafa Okmen, 
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Another matter in this regard is that even if registered Syrians in Turkey have granted 
rights regarding basic needs and services there is a lack of knowledge on how the Turkish 
system works and which are they rights and services available to them45. As Annette 
Groth’s explains in her report on “A stronger European response to the Syrian refugee 
crisis” (Doc. 14014), Syrian refugees in Turkey faces really difficult conditions. The 
report describes how “non-camp” Syrian refugees in Turkey have problems in accessing 
accommodation, education and labour markets and occasional difficulties with access to 
health care, and that many live in poverty and debt.  
In essence, Turkish “temporary protection” in its current form falls short of promising a 
secure, long-term solution for refugees from Syria, because it only creates a framework 
addressing short-term protection. Therefore, current legislation on international 
protection of refugees in Turkey remains inadequate, bringing into question whether 
Turkey can be really called a “safe third country” and leaving temporary protected 
persons in a limbo.   
7.4. The “safe third country” and the “first country of asylum” 
The Geneva Convention does not explicitly contain the concept of a “safe third country”, 
but on the APD, a list of procedural safeguards were established to ensure that those 
countries designated as a “safe third country” complies with international and EU laws. 
Specifically this four criteria have to be fulfilled (art. 38 APD):  
a) Life and liberty of the asylum claimants and refugees cannot be menaced 
because of race, religion, nationality, or membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion;  
b) Has to be no risk of serious harm as defined in Directive 2011/95/EU;  
c) non-refoulement has to be respected;  
d) Prohibition of removal, in violation of the right to freedom from torture and 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is respected; and  
                                                     
Pinar Yazgan, Deniz Eroglu Utku and Ibrahim Sirkeci. London. 2015. p.102. Available at: 
https://www.academia.edu/15916151/Migration_Policy_and_Migration_Management_of_Syrians_in_Tur
key [22 March 2018] 
45 Ibid. p. 102 
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e) Has to exist the possibility to request refugee status and, if found to be a 
refugee, to be accorded Refugee Convention protection. 
The concept is also found in the APD in connection with the so-called “first country of 
asylum”. Article 35 APD allows the return of refugees to the “first country of asylum”, 
where a person either has already been recognised as a refugee or enjoys “sufficient 
protection”. When applying the concept of “first country of asylum” Member States have 
to take into account Article 38 of the APD, which allows people to be returned to a “safe 
third country”, where they will not be at risk of persecution or refoulement, and where 
they will be able to request refugee status.  
It could seem—from Article 33 and 35 to the APD— that asylum-seekers should apply 
for asylum in the first safe country they are able to reach, meaning in this case that: 
- Turkey will be responsible for asylum applications of asylum-seekers that reach 
the country, because it is the “first safe country” they reached after they left their 
country of origin.  
- If asylum seekers reach the EU by crossing Turkey, they will be returned to 
Turkey, since it is considered to be a “safe third country”.  
Moreover, Article 38.2 APD provides Member States with the possibility to not examine 
an asylum claim where, due to a sufficient connection with a "safe third country", the 
applicant can instead seek protection there (allowing Member States to close the asylum 
procedure and to return the asylum applicant to the “safe third country” in question). 
A Commission’s Communication46 noted that if there is a connection with the third 
country, and if it is reasonable for the applicant to go to that country, it can also be taken 
into account whether the applicant has transited through the “safe third country” in 
question, or whether the third country is geographically close to the country of origin of 
the applicant47.  
                                                     
46 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council on the State of Play of Implementation of the Priority Actions under the European Agenda on 
Migration. COM/2016/085 final. Brussels. 2016. Pg. 18. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/implementation_europeanagenda_migration_state_of_play_20160
210_en.pdf [21 March 2018] 
47 DIMITRIADI ANGELIKI. The Impact of the EU-Turkey Statement on Protection and Reception: the 
Case of Greece. Athens. October 2016. p.6. Available at: 
http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/gte_wp_15.pdf [13 April 2018]  
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Nonetheless, the UNHCR does not consider just transit as a sufficient connection or 
meaningful link, unless there is a formal agreement for the allocation of responsibility for 
determining refugee status between countries with comparable asylum systems and 
standards48. Furthermore, there is no legal international rule allowing the countries to 
transfer the responsibility of processing an asylum claimant to another country because 
the “safe third country” concept. In fact, it does not exist any obligation as such to apply 
in the first country reached after fleeing the country of origin49. 
On another hand, Amnesty International (AI) is one of the many organizations to criticize 
the prospect of returns to Turkey, arguing insufficient protection for refugees. AI 
estimated that around 3 million asylum seekers and refugees in Turkey are being left to 
meet their own shelter needs. This contrasts with the guidelines for protection settled by 
the UNHCR including: access to adequate living standards, work, education, health care 
and access to a secure legal status50.  
In addition, NUR OSSO BERFIN in Success of Failure?51 explains and proofs that 
Turkey is not a safe country: “just a few months after the EU-Turkey deal, in June 2016, 
Turkish border guards killed eleven Syrians refugees who attempted to cross the Syrian-
Turkish border and this case brought the question of the lives of the asylum-seekers being 
highly threatened. Indeed their right to life was violated by the Turkish authorities”.  
In conclusion, the concepts settled in the APD allows the EU Member States to exercise 
discretion in determining which country is deemed “safe”, producing a systematic result 
of Member States finding applications inadmissible and therefore people been returned 
to Turkey. Thus, the EU-Turkey Agreement was created assuming Turkey was a safe 
place without questioning if Turkey met all four APD criteria.  
                                                     
48 UNHCR. Legal considerations on the return of asylum-seekers and refugees from Greece to Turkey as 
part of the EU-Turkey Cooperation in Tackling the Migration Crisis under the safe third country and first 
country of asylum concept. March 2016. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/56f3ec5a9 [20 March 2018]  
49 EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON REFUGEE AND EXILES (ECRE): Debunking the “Safe Third Country” 
Myth. Policy note #08, 2017. Available at: https://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Policy-Note-
08.pdf [13 April 2018] 
50 DIMITRIADI ANGELIKI. Op cit. p.5. 
51 NUR OSSO BERFIN. Success or Failure? Assessment of the Readmission Agreement between the EU 
and Turkey from the Legal and Political Perspectives. Prague. 2016. p. 11. Available at: 
www.academia.edu [13 April 2018] 
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Meanwhile, asylum seekers find themselves facing conditions that do not match with the 
“safe country” basic assumptions.  
7.5. The principle of non-refoulement and the collective expulsions 
It was agreed, in the EU-Turkey Statement, that irregular migrants shall be returned to 
Turkey “excluding any kind of collective expulsion” and also, “all migrants will be 
protected in accordance with the relevant international standards and in respect of the 
principle of non-refoulement”.  
As we seen previously, the non-refoulement principle is prohibited under the Article 33 
of the Geneva Convention “no Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a 
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom 
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion”. 
Non-rejection at the border was also included in the principle of non-refoulement and 
supported by various Conclusions of UNHCR’s Executive Committee52. It should be 
noted that simply denying entry or returning a boat to the high seas is not necessarily in 
breach of the principle of non-refoulement if it does not have as result the risk of those 
persons.  
On the other hand, “collective expulsion” is prohibited under Protocol No. 4 of the ECHR. 
Collective expulsion can be any measure of the competent authorities compelling aliens 
as a group to leave the country, except when such measures are taken on the basis of a 
reasonable examination of the particular cases of each individual of the group. Thus, if a 
number of aliens receive similar decisions it does not mean that there is a “collective 
expulsion”— if each person concerned has been given the opportunity to put arguments 
against its expulsion to the competent authorities on an individual basis. Moreover, there 
                                                     
52 UNHCR. A thematic Compilation of Executive Committee Conclusions. 7th edition, June 2014. Available 
at: http://www.unhcr.org/53b26db69.pdf [13 April 2018] 
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will be no violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 if the lack of an expulsion decision 
made on an individual basis is the consequence of an applicant’s own culpable conduct53. 
However, AI reports proved that in the late 2015 and the early 2016, asylum-seekers and 
refugees in Turkey were sent back to Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria54, even the risk they 
were facing. Other reports also showed that there was a case of forced return of thirty 
Afghan asylum-seekers, even though the prohibition of collective expulsion55. The 
treatment within Turkey shows that the country does not provide effective protection 
against refoulement and it also breaches one of the main rules regarding collective 
expulsion.   
7.6. The Asylum Law in Greece 
The 2013 recast of the Asylum Procedures Directive established special procedures to 
deal with specific cases, distinguishing between prioritised procedures (art. 31.7) and 
accelerated procedures (art. 31.8). 
Prioritised procedures entail a more rapid examination of claims in accordance with all 
principles and guarantees, while accelerated procedures differ from regular procedural 
rules by introducing shorter time limits –for those applications based on not relevant 
issues, if the applicant is from a safe country, if false documents are presented, if he/she 
acted in bad faith, or if they refuse to give their fingerprints, etc. 
Seems pretty reasonable that in one hand, Member States prioritise applications from 
persons with manifestly well-founded claims warranting special procedural guarantees, 
and, on the other hand, unfounded applications are accelerated under a less protective 
procedural regime (on the assumption that the application will probably be rejected). 
                                                     
53 ECtHR. Guide on Article 4 of Protocol No.4 to the European Convention on Human Rights. April 2017. 
Available at: https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_4_Protocol_4_ENG.pdf [12 April 2018]  
54 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. No safe refuge asylum-seekers and refugees denied effective protection 
in Turkey. London, 2016. Available at: 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR4438252016ENGLISH.pdf [13 March 2018] 
55 REUTERS WORLD NEWS. Amnesty says 30 Afghans forcibly returned from Turkey. March 23, 2016. 
Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-turkey-afghans-idUSKCN0WP2JK [13 
April 2018] 
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However, the assumption of unfoundedness is questionable due to the APD leaves that 
determination to the Member States [paragraph (20) and Article 32 of the APD]. 
Under the Greek national law, a “Fast-track border procedure” (procedure implemented 
by the Article 60.4 of the Law No. 4375/2016)56 takes place in the Reception and 
Identification Centres (RIC) –Art. 10— of Lesvos, Chios, Samos, Leros and Kos. It is 
applicable when large numbers of third country nationals or stateless persons arrive in the 
country applying for international protection at the border or while they remain in RIC. 
It is an exceptional procedure which has to be completed, at first and second instance, in 
14 days. 
First of all, this fast-track procedure seems to fall outside the concepts of “prioritising” 
well-founded claims or “accelerating” unfounded ones, due the procedure has been 
consciously applied only in cases of applicants subject to the EU-Turkey statement, i.e. 
People arriving through the Evros border and the island of Crete are not subject to the 
fast-track border procedure— which is not applicable in those places— so they have been 
transferred to Kos57 were it is applicable, under the excuse to move them to detention 
centres in the mainland for security concerns or because risk of absconding. 
Furthermore, the proof of this facts is a letter58 sent to the EU Member States’ Interior 
Ministers ahead of the JHA Council from the Greek Minister for Migration Policy, 
Ioannis Mouzalas, asking to approve Greece’s request to transfer specific groups of 
people from the hotspots on the islands to selected detention centres on the mainland, 
without exempting them from the application of the EU-Turkey statement. Even though 
the fast-track procedure should not applied to vulnerable groups or persons falling within 
the family provisions of the Dublin III Regulation [Article 60(4) Law No. 4375/2016], a 
report published by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in July 2017 demonstrates that “far 
                                                     
56 It transposes the APD within the Greek system. On the 16th of June, the Greek Parliament approved an 
amendment (L 4399/2016) modifying the composition of Appeals Committees and the right of asylum 
seekers to be heard in appeals against negative decisions 
57 More information of the transfers at ECRE. The other Greek island: Squalid conditions and arbitrary 
deportation in Crete. 22 September 2017. Available online at: http://bit.ly/2fnyQFb [May 2018] 
58 See “ANNEX IV. Translation of the Statement of the letter of the Minister of Immigration Policy, 
Yannnis Mouzalas, to the ministers of Interior and Immigration of the European Union”. 
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from being over-identified, vulnerable people are falling through the cracks and are not 
being adequately identified and cared for.”59 
Additionally, AI explains in “A blueprint for despair. Human rights impact of the EU-
Turkey Deal”, 19 March 2016, that camps on the islands were evacuated and thousands 
were transferred on ferries to camps on the mainland. The evacuated camps were 
transformed into detention facilities to hold new arrivals in anticipation of the finalising 
of the necessary readmission procedures with Turkey. It was the Greek national 
authorities whom chose to enforce a restriction60 new asylum seekers to remain on the 
islands. Even though deprivation of liberty— under international standards61— is only 
lawfully if it is in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law detentions related to 
immigration control is permissible as, for example, to prevent unauthorized entries.  
Secondly, it has to be noted that the fast-track procedure has to be concluded in a very 
short time period (no more than 2 weeks). This may result in the underestimation of the 
procedural and qualification guarantees provided by the International, European and 
National legal standards, including the right to be assisted by a lawyer (e.g. contradiction 
with Article 43 of the APD, which does not permit restrictions on the procedural rights 
available in a border procedure for reasons related to large numbers of arrivals). The 
Director of the Asylum Service in Greece, Maria Stavropoulou, recognised in 2016 that: 
“Insufferable pressure is being put on us to reduce our standards and minimise the 
guarantees of the asylum process... to change our laws, to change our standards to 
the lowest possible under the EU [Asylum Procedures] directive.” 62 
                                                     
59 MSF. A dramatic deterioration for asylum seekers on Lesvos. July 2017, 3. Available at:  
https://www.msf.org/sites/msf.org/files/msf_lesbos_vulnerability_report1.pdf [3 May 2018] 
60 Article 14.2. Law. No. 4375/201660 allows the restriction of liberty of those third-country nationals or 
stateless persons entering the Reception and identification Centre 
61 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 9; European Convention on Human Rights, 
Article 5(1) (; American Convention on Human Rights, Article 7; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, Article 6; Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 3; American Declaration on the Rights 
and Duties of Man, Articles I and XXV; Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any 
Form of Detention or Imprisonment, Principle 2; EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 6. 
62 PSAROUPOULOS JOHN. Greek asylum system reaches breaking point. IRIN news. Athens, 31 March 
2016. Available at: https://www.irinnews.org/news/2016/03/31/greek-asylum-system-reaches-breaking-
point [May 2018] 
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Thirdly, the EU-Turkey Statement— in disregard of formal rules— accelerated the 
process only for certain nationalities applications, and limiting nationalities within the 
fast-track border procedure also violates Article 43 of the APD. This “discrimination” has 
been proven by the AIDA [the Asylum Information Database managed by the ECRE 
(European Council on Refugees and Exiles)] in the Differential Treatment of Specific 
Nationalities in the Procedure document available online:  
- “Applications by Syrian asylum seekers are examined on admissibility on the basis 
of the Safe Third Country concept, with the exception of Dublin cases and 
vulnerable applicants who are referred to the regular procedure”; 
- “Applications by non-Syrian asylum seekers from countries with a recognition 
rate below 25% are examined only on the merits”; 
- “Applications by non-Syrian asylum seekers from countries with a recognition 
rate over 25% are examined on both admissibility and merits (“merged 
procedure”)”. 
The Asylum recognition rate is defined by the EUROSTAT Statistics Explained website, 
as “the share of positive decisions in the total number of asylum decisions for each stage 
of the asylum procedure i.e. first instance and final on appeal). The total number of 
decisions consist of the sum of positive and negative decisions”. On another side, the 
merits is referred to a judgment or decision of a court based upon the facts presented in 
evidence and the law applied to that evidence. 
This demonstrates that the applications shall be examined upon a first selection procedure 
that will consist on the nationality. Ariel Ricker, a refugee rights lawyer working on 
Lesvos with Advocates Abroad, spoke against it saying that the fast-track procedure was 
a "racist policy" which is "exclusionary and illegal”63. 
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees mentioned in its latest recommendations to 
Greece64 that: “Discriminatory practices, which delay the registration of claims of some 
                                                     
63 BROOMFIELD MATT. The New Arab News: ‘Racist and illegal’ fast-track deportations target North 
African and Asian refugees in Greece. 23 October, 2017. Available at: www.alaraby.co.uk  [17 April 2018] 
64 UNHCR. Bureau for Europe. UNHCR Recommendations for Greece in 2017. February 2017. Available 
at: http://www.unhcr.org/58d8e8e64.pdf [24 March 2018] 
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nationalities (such as Afghans and Iraqis), are not in line with EU and Greek standards. 
On the mainland, first instance decisions for those pre-registered during the summer of 
2016 will take approximately two years. The lack of capacity to fully process asylum 
claims within a reasonable timeframe needs to be addressed. It directly contributes to the 
significant tensions in many of the asylum-seeker sites, generates onward movement and 
prevents working towards the implementation of solutions”. 
Fourthly, the fast-track border procedure examines whether applications may be 
dismissed on the ground that Turkey is a “safe third country” or a “first country of 
asylum”65. That means that first instance decisions dismisses Syrian applications on the 
basis that Turkey is a safe third country using a pre-defined template provided to Regional 
Asylum Offices or Asylum Units on the islands. But, as analysed before, Turkey is not a 
safe third country. Furthermore, on the 22nd of September 2017, the Greek Council of 
State delivered two rulings concerning two Syrian nationals who challenged the fast-track 
procedure of the Greek asylum system following the EU-Turkey statement of 18 March 
2016. The Council of State agreed with the Appeals Committee that the applicants’ claims 
were inadmissible based on the “safe third country” concept. It also refused by narrow 
majority to refer a preliminary question to the CJEU on the interpretation of Article 38 of 
the APD66. 
In essence, the asylum procedure in Greece does not follow any distinction between 
prioritised and accelerated procedures since it applies the fast-track procedure to 
“manifestly well-founded” and “manifestly unfounded” caseloads alike67.  
Moreover, since Greek authorities will find all those applications unfounded or dismissed 
because of the “first country” or “third safe country” concepts, asylum seekers will be 
returned to Turkey and excluded from relocation in practice. That means that no adequate 
safeguards are provided while been applied to all asylum seekers falling under the EU-
                                                     
65 AIDA. Asylum Information Database. Aida 2016 update: Greece. March 2017. Available at: 
http://www.asylumineurope.org/news/28-03-2017/aida-2016-update-greece [17 April 2018] 
66 Greek Council of State. Decisions 2347/2017 and 2348/2017. Plenary Session. 22 September 2017.  
67 AIDA. Asylum Information Database. Accelerated, prioritised and Fast-track asylum procedures. Legal 
frameworks and practice in Europe. May 2017. Available at: https://www.ecre.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/AIDA-Brief_AcceleratedProcedures.pdf [17 April 2018] 
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Turkey Statement scope. Meanwhile, they remain detained in refugee camps in non-
acceptable conditions, and their lives in jeopardize. 
It is really doubtful if Greece is neither a safe country nor appropriate for register 
migrant’s applications of asylum as the EU-Turkey Statement settles.  
7.7.The 1:1 Resettlement mechanism 
Before the EU-Turkey Statement— which stablished that for every Syrian national 
returned from the Greek islands another will be resettled to the EU directly from 
Turkey— two mechanisms were adopted. 
Under the emergency Relocation Scheme, adopted by the Council in September 2015, 
asylum seekers with a high chance of having their applications successfully processed 
were going to be relocated from Greece and Italy to other Member States where they 
could have their asylum applications processed. If the applications were finally 
successful, the applicants could have the refugee status granted included the right to reside 
in the Member State to which they were relocated. The EU budget provided financial 
support to the participating Member States.  
On another hand, in May 2015, the Commission proposed a European Resettlement 
Scheme which was adopted by the Council in July 2015. To avoid displaced persons in 
need of protection having to resort to the criminal networks of smugglers and traffickers, 
the resettlement programme provided legal pathways to enter the EU. This scheme 
provided resettlement for 22,000 people in need of international protection from outside 
of the EU to the EU Member States, and it was also supported by the EU budget.  
a. Resettlement 
Resettlement is defined by UNHCR as 'the selection and transfer of refugees from a state 
in which they have sought protection to a third country that admits them – as refugees – 
with a permanent residence status'. It is a durable solution for refugees. 
The core of the EU-Turkey Statement is the 1:1 swapping mechanism, consisting in the 
resettlement of one Syrian refugee from Turkey for each irregular migrant readmitted 
from the Greek islands. In exchange for its cooperation in halting irregular crossing and 
fighting smuggling,—and 6 billion euros—Turkey negotiated an acceleration of the visa 
liberalisation dialogue, an upgrade of the Customs Union and a “re-energisation” of the 
dragging accession talks. 
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The table below of the ANNEX to the Fifteenth Report on Relocation and Resettlement 
from the Commission68 to the European Parliament, the European Council, and the 
Council, shows the state of play of the resettlements as of 4 September 2017, under the 
20 July 2015 Conclusions69 and under the 1:1 mechanism with Turkey: 
 
 
                                                     
68 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European 
Council and the Council. Fifteenth report on relocation and resettlement. Brussels. 6.9.2017.  
69 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Outcome of the Council meeting. 3405th Council meeting. 
Justice and Home Affairs. Brussels. 20 July 2015. 
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We can see that the only countries that had fulfilled the pledges made were Estonia, 
Finland, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden, and UK – as well as three Associated 
Countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland). Out of the 22,504 pledges made 
under the 20 July 2015 scheme, 17.305 resettlements were actually carried out (8,834 
people resettled from Turkey under the 1:1 mechanism, 3,621 through the 20 July 2015 
scheme, and 5,213 in addition to it). On another hand, is also noticed that some countries 
did not resettled one single refugee at the time of 2017, as: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.  
Among the countries that did not complied with the scheme, Poland and Hungary have 
actually refused to accept asylum-seekers. Slovakia, which unsuccessfully challenged the 
relocation scheme in the European Court, only accepted 16 of the 902 asylum-seekers it 
was assigned, and the Czech Republic only 52 over 400. Spain only fulfilled the 13.7% 
(631 out of 1,449) of its quota. 
b. Relocation 
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On the other side relocation refers to the movement of refugees from one EU Member 
State to another. It is an intra-EU process, in which Member States helps another 
Member State to cope with the pressure of hosting a relatively large refugee population 
by agreeing to receive a number of them. Relocation is an expression of internal EU 
solidarity and burden-sharing, particularly with those countries at the borders of Europe 
that receive a high number of refugees. 
The Fifteenth Report on Relocation and Resettlement it also shows the state of play of 
the Relocations from Italy and Greece (the countries of the EU with more mass influx of 
asylum seekers). 
Nonetheless, not a single country fulfilled the commitment legally foreseen in the Council 
Decisions (except Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland, which relocated more people 
than some Member States). The relocation scheme for those asylum seekers arriving in 
Greece and Italy was planned to support Greece with the relocation of 63,302 persons and 
Italy with 34,953 – a total of 98,255 relocations and only 27,695 were effectively 
relocated. However, with the EU-Turkey Statement reducing irregular flows to Greece 
and the majority of migrants arriving in Italy not being eligible, the number of persons to 
be relocated turned out to be much lower.  
 
As we see in the graphic above based on Hellenic Coast Guard data70, after March 2016 
the inflow of persons arriving reduced drastically and, in this regard, the Statement has 
been successful. 
                                                     
70 UNHCR. UNHCR Greece factsheet. Highlights of the month. 1-31 July 2016. Available at: 
http://donors.unhcr.gr/en/unhcr-greece-factsheet-july-2016/ [May 2018] 
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As a result, since the Statement was agreed, asylum seekers have unlawfully been 
excluded from the relocation scheme, and many remain trapped on the islands71. 
In conclusion, it is not clear that the deal does anything to provide alternative safe routes 
to those in need to reach Europe. Besides, the resettlement of Syrian refugees should not 
be linked to the number of returns or arrivals since the European Union has the duty to 
open humanitarian pathways for all refugees from Turkey, and other countries72. 
Further, based on UNHCR data, from the total of displaced people due to the Syrian war 
more than 5 million are in neighbouring countries in the Middle East and North Africa, 
but just 1 million have moved to Europe, or tried so. Despite European countries do not 
sustain the burden of the crisis, they have utterly failed to fulfil their commitments with 
resettlement, but also to relocate asylum-seekers and help Greece and Italy. Thus, Europe 
could not even help their own. 
The table below of the ANNEX to the Fifteenth Report on Relocation and Resettlement 
present the latest state of play of the implementation of the relocation scheme as of 
September 2017: 
                                                     
71 KOENIG NICOLE and WALTER-FRANKE MARIE. One year on: what lessons from the EU-Turkey 
“deal”? Jacques Delors Institute, Berlin. 14 March 2017: “In early 2017, Amnesty International estimated 
that at least 15,000 migrants were stuck on the Greek islands in dire conditions and with unclear prospects”. 
p.4. Available at: http://www.delorsinstitut.de/2015/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/20170317_EU-Turkey-
deal-one-year-on-NK-MW.pdf [6 April 2018] 
72 STRIK TINEKE. Council of Europe. Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 2109. The situation of 
refugees and migrants under the EU–Turkey Agreement of 18 March 2016. Netherlands. 20 April 2016. 
Available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/583739a54.html [8 March 2018] 
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7.8. Measures against the States that did not fulfil the commitment 
According to the EU law system, the Commission may take legal action – named 
infringement procedure – against a Member State that fails to implement EU law by 
referring the issue to the Court of Justice, which in certain cases, can impose financial 
penalties. 
The procedure follows a number of steps laid out in the Article 258 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFUE), each one ending with a formal decision: 
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1. Firstly, the Commission sends a letter requesting further information to the 
country, which must send a detailed reply within a specified period (usually 2 
months). 
2. Secondly, the Commission evaluates if the country is failing to fulfil its 
obligations under EU law. If concludes that the country failed, it may send a 
reasoned opinion explaining why it considers that the country is breaching EU 
law, finally requesting the country to inform of the measures it will take (2 
months) and a request to comply with EU law. 
3. Thirdly, if the EU country still doesn't comply, the Commission may decide to 
refer the matter to the Court of Justice.  
4. Finally, if the Court finds that the country has breached EU law, the national 
authorities must take action to comply with the Court judgment. 
If despite the Court's judgment, the MS still does not rectify the situation, the Commission 
may refer the MS back to the Court. Nonetheless, a second time before the Court implies 
that the Court might impose financial penalties—which can be either a lump sum and/or 
a daily payment—taking into account the importance of the rules breached and the impact 
of the infringement on general and particular interests and the country's ability to pay. 
The Commission also publishes an annual report presenting infringement cases by policy 
area and country. 
Under the Relocation Scheme, the Council Decisions73  required Member States to pledge 
available places for relocation every three months to ensure a swift and orderly relocation 
procedure. As explained before, Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic utterly failed to 
fulfil their commitments with their neighbouring countries. Thus, the 15th June 2017, the 
Commission launched infringement procedures against those Member States. 
                                                     
73 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area 
of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece; and Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 
22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit 
of Italy and Greece.  
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However, the replies sent back to the Commission were not satisfactory74, due none of 
them secured relocations within their territory. Further, none of the arguments invoked 
by those Member States justified the failure to pledge places for relocation.  
Since Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland did not comply with their legal obligations 
on relocation—ignoring the problem Greece and Italy were facing— the Commission 
decided to move to the next stage of the infringement procedure.  
On the second step in the procedure, which consists in requesting to comply with EU 
law— calling on the Member States to inform the Commission of the measures taken to 
comply within a specified period— this time the Member States had just one month to 
respond because the urgency of the situation.  
Nonetheless, the reply received was not satisfactory, so the Commission decided to move 
to the next stage of the infringement procedure, and refer the case to the Court of Justice 
of the EU.  
The next stage of the infringement procedure before the Court of Justice started on 6 
September 2017, and the Court dismissed in its entirety the challenges75 brought by 
Hungary and Slovakia against the provisional mechanism of mandatory relocation (all 
three Member States always have expressed their disapproval on the relocation scheme 
in general). 
In accordance with the rules governing infringement procedures, if the CJEU finds that 
those Member States have failed to fulfil the obligations, they can be required to take the 
necessary measures to comply with the judgment. If Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic 
do not take those measures to comply with the judgment, a financial measure will be 
imposed. 
                                                     
74 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. PRESS RELEASE. Relocation: Commission moves to next stage in 
infringement procedures against the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland Brussels. 26 July 2017. 
Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-
2019/avramopoulos/announcements/relocation-commission-moves-next-stage-infringement-procedures-
against-czech-republic-hungary-and_en [23 April 2018] 
75 EDAL. European Database of Asylum Law. CJEU - Judgment in Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15 
Slovakia and Hungary v Council. Available at: http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/content/cjeu-joined-
cases-c-64315-and-c-64715-slovak-republic-and-hungary-v-council-european-union-6 [29 April 2018] 
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8. LEGAL NATURE 
a. The elements of the Contract 
Among the main issues of discussion due to the controversy of the Statement, its legal 
nature from the perspective of European law has been one of the most important.  
First of all, it could seem that both Contracting Parties have legal capacity to perform an 
Agreement, as the Republic of Turkey is a sovereign State, able to establish legal relations 
with other subjects in an international level (ius ad tractatum76) even if it never ratified 
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties—, which establishes in its Article 6 
the capacity of every State to perform Treaties.  
However, even if the European Union has full juridical personality because it is an 
International Organisation77– with their own, permanent, independent bodies in charge to 
manage collective interests, as we will analyse in the following part— it has never been 
clarified which European institution was the other formal Contracting Party of the 
Statement. It is important to clarify that the European Council is in charge of the Union 
interests and defines the general guidelines for the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP), and it also decides on common strategies for its implementation (Article 26 
TEU)78. Thus, the European Council is enabled to develop relations with the neighbouring 
States –as Turkey—and can establish agreements including rights and obligations.  
Secondly, from a first reading of the Statement, we see that Turkey committed to take all 
necessary measures to prevent the creation of new sea or land routes for smugglers while 
the EU engaged with the fulfilment of the visa liberalization for Turkish citizens at the 
latest by the end of June 2016. So it is clear that the Statement concluded at the time had 
obligations and rights. 
From this, we could think that the binding character of the Statement is identifiable 
because the instrument complies with the requirements demanded for an international 
treaty (e.g. it was concluded in writing and establishes obligations and rights, falling 
                                                     
76 Capacity to conduct treaties under international legal personality.  
77 Article 47 Treaty on European Union: The Union shall have legal personality.  
78 For more information: EUROPEAN COMMISSION. The European Union Explained. How the 
European Union works. Your guide to the EU institutions. Brussels. 2014. Available at: 
https://europa.rs/images/publikacije/HTEUW_How_the_EU_Works.pdf [April 2018] 
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within the requirements established in the Vienna Convention). But, several scholars –as 
Ignacio Odriozola79– disagree about the legal nature and execution of the Statement. One 
of the many arguments he used is that it consists in a soft law declaration, meaning that 
the Statement has no legal force and thus the no-compliance has no repercussion in the 
international panorama80. Nonetheless, even though soft law rules do not have real legal 
effectiveness per se¸ that does not mean they have no effectivity at all, because it has 
influence over States, communitarian institutions and individuals. Soft or non-binding 
rules can have effectivity as a Treaty or a binding rule despite the soft law “voluntary” 
feature. If and International actor perceive the rule as a hard norm it might behave 
accordingly and in result – in this case in regard of the Statement – will prove effective81. 
Another problem that rises from the Statement conception is the economic disbursement 
agreed in the Statement (initially 3 billion euros for the Facility for Refugees in Turkey 
and further projects, and 3 additional billion euros up to the end of 2018). As known, the 
annual EU budget has to be agreed by the Council and the European Parliament by a 
proposal from the Commission. If the Council and the European Parliament do not reach 
an agreement, the Commission has to present a new draft annual budget82. As established 
in the Statement, the first disbursement of 3 billion euros for Turkey was conducted in 
2016 by a proposal of the European Commission – 1 billion from the EU budget and other 
2 billion from MS contributions83—and the 14th of March 2018 the European 
                                                     
79 ODRIOZOLA IGNACIO. El lado oculto del Acuerdo Unión Europea-Turquía. Una mirada crítica desde 
la perspectiva del derecho internacional de los refugiados. Revista de Ciencias Sociales no2. ISSN 2525-
1112. Julio-Diciembre 2016. Available at: 
http://rephip.unr.edu.ar/bitstream/handle/2133/6850/PRCS%20No%202%20Odriozola.pdf?sequence=3 [4 
April 2018] 
80 MAURICIO IVÁN DEL TORO HUERTA. El fenómeno del soft law y las nuevas perspectivas del 
derecho internacional. Anuario Mexicano de Derecho Internacional. Vol. VI, 2006. Pp.513-549.  
81 M.ZERRILLI FILIPPO. The rule of soft law: an introduction. Journal of Global and Historical 
Anthropology 56. 2010. Available at: https://revistas.juridicas.unam.mx/index.php/derecho-
internacional/article/viewFile/160/256 [6 April 2018] 
82 For more information regarding EU budget, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu  
83 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council. Second Annual Report on the Facility for Refugees in Turkey. Brussels. 14 March 2018. p. 6. 
Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/sites/near/files/14032018_facility_for_refugees_in_turkey_second_annual_report.pdf  
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Commission84 decided to mobilise the other 3 billion. Even though, it is not clear the 
participation of this institutions regarding the Statement creation since they all have 
denied their involvement. 
In addition, the TFUE establishes in its article 214 that the Union's operations in the field 
of humanitarian aid— when helping victims of  third-countries from natural or man-made 
disasters—shall be conducted in compliance with the principles of international law (in 
line with the principles of impartiality, neutrality and non-discrimination). The European 
Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance, shall establish the measures defining 
the framework within which the Union's humanitarian aid operations shall be 
implemented. But, as we will see next, the Council has proclaimed that it did not had any 
participation in the creation of the Statement.  
b. The stakeholders of the Contract 
After the 18th of March 2016 two Pakistani nationals and an Afghan national travelled 
from Turkey to Greece, where they submitted applications for asylum. In view of the 
possibility to been returned to their countries of origin, they started actions before the 
General Court of the European Union aiming to challenge the legality of the Statement85.  
According to those asylum seekers, the Statement infringed the rules of the TFUE relating 
to the conclusion of international agreements by the EU. The General Court dismissed 
the three actions alleging that the Statement did not relate to an act of the European 
Council nor of any other body, office or agency of the Union and hence that the Court 
lacked of jurisdiction. 
However, the Court stated that there were inaccuracies regarding the identification of the 
authors of the Statement. The evidences showed that it was not the EU but its Member 
States the ones conducting negotiations with Turkey.  
The European Council repeatedly manifested before the Court and in different fora that 
“the meeting between the EU and Turkey to which the press release that contains the 
                                                     
84 EUROPEAN COMISSION. Press release. EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey: the Commission proposes 
additional funds for Syrian refugees. Brussels. 14 March 2018. [May 2018] 
85 See “ANNEX V. ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber, Extended Composition). 28 
February 2017. Case T-193/16” 
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Statement refers, was not a meeting of the European Council, but an informal meeting of 
representatives of Heads of State or Government of which no minutes are kept” 86. 
The Council also submitted to the Court that “it was not the author of the EU-Turkey 
Statement and that it had not been in any way involved in the structured dialogue that 
took place between the representatives of the Member States and the Republic of 
Turkey”87. 
Of course, the Commission also claimed that “no agreement” was concluded between the 
EU and the Republic of Turkey. Furthermore, the Commission replied that it was clear 
from the vocabulary used in the EU-Turkey statement, “that it was not a legally binding 
agreement but a political arrangement reached by the ‘Members of the European Council, 
[that is to say,] the Heads of State or Government of the Member States, the President of 
the European Council and the President of the Commission”88. 
Therefore the European Council and the other institutions of the EU denies having 
concluded an agreement with the Turkish Government89. That is why, in the absence of 
any act of an institution of the EU, the Court concluded its lack of jurisdiction to hear 
about the actions brought by the three asylum seekers.  
On 23rd of April 2017, the asylum seekers lodged an appeal and claimed that the General 
Court made several errors of law and that it was wrong to decline jurisdiction. The 
appellants invoked that, amongst other pleas, the General Court failed to properly 
consider whether the EU-Turkey Statement was in reality a decision of the European 
Council, and failed to investigate and assess material issues90.  
                                                     
86 Email sent to Mr. Tony Bunyan (from State Watch) from Fernando Paulino Pereira (from the Council of 
the European Union) the 6th of April 2017. For more information, full document available at: 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/may/eu-council-sw-eu-turkey.pdf  
87 Paragraph 29 of the Order in Case T-257/16, para.12 in each of the other two Orders. 
88 Paragraph 28 of the Order in Case T-257/16, para.12 in each of the other two Orders. 
89 CJEU. General Court of the European Union. Press release No. 19/17. Luxembourg, 28 February 2017: 
The Court accepted the European Council’s argument that separate meetings had taken place, one 
conducted by the European Council on 17 March and one by the heads of state or government in an 
international summit with Turkey on 18 March. Thus the Court concluded that it was during the 
international summit that the Statement with Turkey was concluded.  
90 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Information note to the Permanent Representatives 
Committee about the cases C-208/17 P, C-209/17 P and C-210/17 P before the Court of Justice. Brussels. 
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As the resolution of the Appeal is still in process, the answer regarding the legality of the 
Statement is unknown.  
c.  Conclusion 
In the event that the Statement was agreed by the European Council, we can admit that it 
does complies with the elements required by the international law to be considered a soft 
law act with relative effectiveness. Despite this, it is still not clear if the Statement does 
lack of the support of the European Institutions—transcendental if we take into account 
the procedures needed to approve the EU budget and how to spend it. Moreover, the 
refugees’ problem seems to be a topic addressed to both the Parliament and the EU 
Council –as they are the Institutions with the legislative capacity to adopt measures 
addressing humanitarian aid— though they claimed not to be involved in the creation of 
the Statement. 
Therefore we could see that the European Council, the Council of the EU and the 
European Commission maintained the following position before the Court: “it wasn’t 
me”91. This calls into question the transparency of the EU decision-making, the evasion 
of the European democracy standards, and the EU judicial review. 
On another hand, the European institutions “redirected” such responsibility to the Heads 
of the Governments of the MS (the Members of the European Council). The ERTA 
doctrine92 developed by the Court and laid down in Article 3(2) TFEU is important in this 
regard. According to the Court's case-law: “Member States may not enter into 
international commitments outside the framework of the Community institutions, even if 
there is no contradiction between those commitments and the common rules”93. This 
                                                     
12 May 2017. 9148/17. Available at: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/may/eu-council-ls-eu-turkey-
appeal-9148-17.pdf [7 April 2018] 
91 CARRERA SERGIO, DEN HERTOG LEONHARD and STEFAN MARCO. “It wasn’t me! The 
Luxemburg Court Orders on the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal” Policy Insights. NO 2017-15/April 2017. p. 2. 
Available at: https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/EU-Turkey%20Deal.pdf [7 April 2018]  
92 Judgment of the Court of 31 March 1971. Commission of the European Communities v Council of the 
European Communities. European Agreement on Road Transport. Case 22-70. Available at: https://eur-
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means that the EU obtains exclusive treaty-making powers when the conclusion of an 
international agreement “may affect common rules or alter their scope”. Besides, the 
Article 4.3 TEU establishes “the duty of sincere and loyal cooperation” by Member States 
and European institutions. Therefore, a ‘crisis’ should not exempt European Union actors 
of acting without full compliance of the EU democratic rule of law standards laid down 
in the Treaties.  
The feeling of the European citizens in front of this situation is that, after all, there is a 
general and persistent lack of information. Since all institutions are avoiding 
responsibilities arising after the legality of the Agreement was challenged, a sensation of 
insecurity and absence of answers make doubt about that EU democratic rule of law.  
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9. CONCLUSIONS  
FIRST. According to my analysis of the legal framework and the Statement itself, the 
fundamental values of Europe established in all the Treaties were undermined, being the 
main conclusion of this paper that the EU-Turkey Statement is not in line with neither the 
International Law nor the EU legal standards. 
SECOND. MS of the EU, in their really small obligations compared with the Middle-
East countries receiving the most important refugees’ inflow, have failed with their 
commitments and the answer of some of them was the closure of the external borders or 
the raising of barriers. The problem was not only tacitly eluded but also actively avoided; 
and when tested with the arrival of thousands of refugees, the response of the EU has 
been the denial of responsibility towards a humanitarian crisis.  
THIRD. The scope of the Statement forces the application of a norm for irregular 
migrants to people seeking protection under the status of refugees. This provoked a lack 
of protection of thousands and a lack of solidarity. 
The Statement also leaves apart some nationalities thus falling in the contradiction of 
being a discriminatory policy. It shortfalls when identifying the ones in need of protection 
and ignores the fact that Syrians are not the only nationality in need of such protection. 
By ignoring other nationalities they also have denied access to elemental human rights 
according to the UDHR.  
FOURTH. Turkey cannot be considered a safe third country under the APD. The 
concrete examples given in this paper – as the inhuman conditions they are facing in the 
camps, the refoulement of vulnerable people, and the collective expulsions— show that 
Turkish treatment of asylum-seekers comes in contradiction with the ECHR and therefore 
with the European values. Moreover, the Turkish asylum system falls short when 
promising secure and long-term solutions. 
FIFTH. The European Commission did well in bringing the cases of Hungary, Poland 
and Check Republic before the CJEU because some measures have to be imposed to those 
who did not complied with the compromises. If we do not ignore the fact that lives have 
been damaged or destroyed because of the inaction of some MS, the outcome of the 
process might be an insufficient financial measure. Thus, coming up with economic 
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sanctions to avoid political sensible solutions seems not a good measure and, in any case, 
it would not be aligned to the European values of democracy and transparency.  
SIXTH. Not only the binding force of the Statement is very doubtful— and we will have 
to wait until the appeal before the CJEU has been resolved— but also the non-
participation of the EU institutions is questionable. Nonetheless, if the creation of the 
Statement was carried by the Heads of the Governments, they have acted on mala fide 
bases according to the ERTA doctrine.  
SEVENTH. The reasons underlying the Statement are also questionable as the national 
interests prevail over the humanitarian ones. By granting the visa-free travel for Turkish 
nationals, an upgrade of the Customs Union and the acceleration of the EU accession 
process, the EU has prevented refugees coming into the European territory. For Turkey, 
in exchange of €6 billion for funding the facilities and profit of the political opportunism, 
had “protected” millions of refugees. Even if the negotiations between the two parties 
have been fruitful –in some way it is a win-win Agreement— it is a completely failure 
from a humanitarian point of view.  
EIGHT. Not only as a student, but also as a European citizen, I have found a tremendous 
lack of transparency from the EU institutions while trying to work on this research. 
Certainly a lot of information is available, but from a critical point of view and after all 
the information received from NGO’s, it felt objectionable. In my opinion a deeper 
research seemed necessary to solve my questions even though I found obstacles. 
NINTH. My research had among other aims to conclude whether the EU-Turkey 
Statement complied with the European and International standards; which it does not. 
But, if we only take into account the effectiveness of the Statement in reducing “irregular 
arrivals”, its goals were achieved: they succeeded in reducing the entrance of migrants to 
Europe which was the non-explicit intention when the Statement was embodied. 
The consequences of such actions threatened the life conditions and the life itself of 
thousands of persons, which in this sense is a true success for the EU and Turkey.  
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ANNEX I. The EU-Turkey Statement, 18th of March 2016, to tackle irregular 
migration 
Today the Members of the European Council met with their Turkish counterpart. This 
was the third meeting since November 2015 dedicated to deepening Turkey-EU relations 
as well as addressing the migration crisis. 
The Members of the European Council expressed their deepest condolences to the people 
of Turkey following the bomb attack in Ankara on Sunday. They strongly condemned 
this heinous act and reiterated their continued support to fight terrorism in all its forms. 
Turkey and the European Union reconfirmed their commitment to the implementation of 
their joint action plan activated on 29 November 2015. Much progress has been achieved 
already, including Turkey's opening of its labour market to Syrians under temporary 
protection, the introduction of new visa requirements for Syrians and other nationalities, 
stepped up security efforts by the Turkish coast guard and police and enhanced 
information sharing. Moreover, the European Union has begun disbursing the 3 billion 
euro of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey for concrete projects and work has advanced 
on visa liberalisation and in the accession talks, including the opening of Chapter 17 last 
December. On 7 March 2016, Turkey furthermore agreed to accept the rapid return of all 
migrants not in need of international protection crossing from Turkey into Greece and to 
take back all irregular migrants intercepted in Turkish waters. Turkey and the EU also 
agreed to continue stepping up measures against migrant smugglers and welcomed the 
establishment of the NATO activity on the Aegean Sea. At the same time Turkey and the 
EU recognise that further, swift and determined efforts are needed. 
In order to break the business model of the smugglers and to offer migrants an alternative 
to putting their lives at risk, the EU and Turkey today decided to end the irregular 
migration from Turkey to the EU. In order to achieve this goal, they agreed on the 
following additional action points: 
1) All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands as from 20 March 
2016 will be returned to Turkey. This will take place in full accordance with EU and 
international law, thus excluding any kind of collective expulsion. All migrants will be 
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protected in accordance with the relevant international standards and in respect of the 
principle of non-refoulement. It will be a temporary and extraordinary measure which is 
necessary to end the human suffering and restore public order. Migrants arriving in the 
Greek islands will be duly registered and any application for asylum will be processed 
individually by the Greek authorities in accordance with the Asylum Procedures 
Directive, in cooperation with UNHCR. Migrants not applying for asylum or whose 
application has been found unfounded or inadmissible in accordance with the said 
directive will be returned to Turkey. Turkey and Greece, assisted by EU institutions and 
agencies, will take the necessary steps and agree any necessary bilateral arrangements, 
including the presence of Turkish officials on Greek islands and Greek officials in Turkey 
as from 20 March 2016, to ensure liaison and thereby facilitate the smooth functioning of 
these arrangements. The costs of the return operations of irregular migrants will be 
covered by the EU. 
2) For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will be 
resettled from Turkey to the EU taking into account the UN Vulnerability Criteria. A 
mechanism will be established, with the assistance of the Commission, EU agencies and 
other Member States, as well as the UNHCR, to ensure that this principle will be 
implemented as from the same day the returns start. Priority will be given to migrants 
who have not previously entered or tried to enter the EU irregularly. On the EU side, 
resettlement under this mechanism will take place, in the first instance, by honouring the 
commitments taken by Member States in the conclusions of Representatives of the 
Governments of Member States meeting within the Council on 20 July 2015, of which 
18.000 places for resettlement remain. Any further need for resettlement will be carried 
out through a similar voluntary arrangement up to a limit of an additional 54.000 persons. 
The Members of the European Council welcome the Commission's intention to propose 
an amendment to the relocation decision of 22 September 2015 to allow for any 
resettlement commitment undertaken in the framework of this arrangement to be offset 
from non-allocated places under the decision. Should these arrangements not meet the 
objective of ending the irregular migration and the number of returns come close to the 
numbers provided for above, this mechanism will be reviewed. Should the number of 
returns exceed the numbers provided for above, this mechanism will be discontinued. 
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3) Turkey will take any necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes for illegal 
migration opening from Turkey to the EU, and will cooperate with neighbouring states 
as well as the EU to this effect. 
4) Once irregular crossings between Turkey and the EU are ending or at least have been 
substantially and sustainably reduced, a Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme will 
be activated. EU Member States will contribute on a voluntary basis to this scheme. 
5) The fulfilment of the visa liberalisation roadmap will be accelerated vis-à-vis all 
participating Member States with a view to lifting the visa requirements for Turkish 
citizens at the latest by the end of June 2016, provided that all benchmarks have been met. 
To this end Turkey will take the necessary steps to fulfil the remaining requirements to 
allow the Commission to make, following the required assessment of compliance with 
the benchmarks, an appropriate proposal by the end of April on the basis of which the 
European Parliament and the Council can make a final decision. 
6) The EU, in close cooperation with Turkey, will further speed up the disbursement of 
the initially allocated 3 billion euros under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey and ensure 
funding of further projects for persons under temporary protection identified with swift 
input from Turkey before the end of March. A first list of concrete projects for refugees, 
notably in the field of health, education, infrastructure, food and other living costs, that 
can be swiftly financed from the Facility, will be jointly identified within a week. Once 
these resources are about to be used to the full, and provided the above commitments are 
met, the EU will mobilise additional funding for the Facility of an additional 3 billion 
euro up to the end of 2018. 
7) The EU and Turkey welcomed the ongoing  work on the upgrading of the Customs 
Union. 
8) The EU and Turkey reconfirmed their commitment to re-energise the accession process 
as set out in their joint statement of 29 November 2015. They welcomed the opening of 
Chapter 17 on 14 December 2015 and decided, as a next step, to open Chapter 33 during 
the Netherlands presidency. They welcomed that the Commission will put forward a 
proposal to this effect in April. Preparatory work for the opening of other Chapters will 
continue at an accelerated pace without prejudice to Member States' positions in 
accordance with the existing rules. 
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9) The EU and its Member States will work with Turkey in any joint endeavour to 
improve humanitarian conditions inside Syria, in particular in certain areas near the 
Turkish border which would allow for the local population and refugees to live in areas 
which will be more safe. 
All these elements will be taken forward in parallel and monitored jointly on a monthly 
basis. 
The EU and Turkey decided to meet again as necessary in accordance with the joint 
statement of 29 November 2015. 
NB: Reference to this press release has been made in the orders rendered by the General 
Court on 20 February 2017 in cases T-192/16, T-193/16 and T-257/16 which are 
currently under appeal. 
 
Source: www.consilium.europa.eu  
 
ANNEX II. The Balkan Route used by refugees, pre-March 2016.  
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, Frontex. Available at www.europenowjournal.org  
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ANNEX III. Legal Framework timeline 
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ANNEX IV. Translation of the Statement of the letter of the Minister of Immigration 
Policy, Yannnis Mouzalas, to the ministers of Interior and Immigration of the 
European Union.  
We are putting forward a press release of the Ministry of Immigration Policy, regarding 
with the letter of the Minister, Yannis Mouzalas, to the Ministers of Interior and 
Immigration of the EU: Within the attempt of the the Greek government, in order to 
transfer the special population of migrants, from the islands to closed camps, without 
diverging from the common Statement of the EU and Turkey, the Minister of immigration 
policy, Yannis Mouzalas, sent a letter to the Ministers of Interior and Immigration of the 
EU, in view of tomorrows consultation . By his letter, mister Mouzalas points out the 
need of reconsideration and implementation pf the Greek proposition, regarding the 
transfer of the special population of migrants, from the islands to predetermined closed 
camps in the mainland, without diverging from the common statement of the EU and 
Turkey. It is noted that the Minister, Yannis Mouzalas, has held a set of meetings with 
eleven Ministers of Interior and Immigration and other institutional entities of the 
European Union but also with competent institutional entities of Turkey, in order to 
implement the request of the Greek government. 
Translation made by Maria Bairaktari, law student from Thessaloniki University 
in Greece 
Source: www.media.gov.gr  
 
ANNEX V. ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber, Extended 
Composition). 28 February 2017. Case T-193/16  
(Action for annulment — EU-Turkey statement of 18 March 2016 — Press release — 
Concept of ‘international agreement’ — Identification of the author of the act — Scope 
of the act — Meeting of the European Council — Meeting of the Heads of State or 
Government of the Member States of the European Union held on the premises of the 
Council of the European Union — Capacity of the representatives of the Member States 
of the European Union during a meeting with the representative of a third country — First 
paragraph of Article 263 TFEU — Lack of jurisdiction) 
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In Case T-193/16, 
NG, residing in Athens (Greece), represented by B. Burns, Solicitor, P. O’Shea and 
I. Whelan, Barristers, 
applicant, 
v 
European Council, represented by K. Pleśniak, Á. de Elera-San Miguel Hurtado and 
S. Boelaert, acting as Agents, 
defendant, 
APPLICATION based on Article 263 TFEU and seeking the annulment of an alleged 
agreement concluded between the European Council and the Republic of Turkey dated 
18 March 2016 and entitled ‘EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016’, 
THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber, Extended Composition), 
composed of I. Pelikánová, President, V. Valančius, P. Nihoul, J. Svenningsen 
(Rapporteur) and U. Öberg, Judges, 
Registrar: E. Coulon, 
makes the following 
Order 
 Background to the dispute 
 The meetings between the European leaders and the Turkish leader prior to 18 March 
2016 
1        On 15 October 2015, the Republic of Turkey and the European Union agreed on a joint 
action plan entitled ‘EU-Turkey joint action plan’ (‘the joint action plan’) designed to 
strengthen their cooperation in terms of supporting Syrian nationals enjoying temporary 
international protection and managing migration, in order to respond to the crisis created 
by the situation in Syria. 
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2        The joint action plan aimed to respond to the crisis situation in Syria in three ways, 
namely, first, by addressing the root causes leading to a mass exodus of Syrians, secondly, 
by providing support to Syrians enjoying temporary international protection and to their 
host communities in Turkey and, thirdly, by strengthening cooperation in the field of 
preventing illegal migration flows towards the European Union. 
3        On 29 November 2015, the Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the 
European Union met with their Turkish counterpart (‘the first meeting of the Heads of 
State or Government’). Following that meeting, they decided to activate the joint action 
plan and, in particular, to step up their active cooperation concerning migrants who were 
not in need of international protection, by preventing them from travelling to Turkey and 
the European Union, by ensuring the application of the established bilateral readmission 
provisions and by swiftly returning migrants who were not in need of international 
protection to their countries of origin. 
4        On 8 March 2016, a statement by the Heads of State or Government of the European 
Union, published by the joint services of the European Council and the Council of the 
European Union, indicated that the Heads of State or Government of the European Union 
had met with the Turkish Prime Minister in regard to relations between the European 
Union and the Republic of Turkey and that progress had been made in the implementation 
of the joint action plan. That meeting had taken place on 7 March 2016 (‘the second 
meeting of the Heads of State or Government’). That statement specified: 
‘The Heads of State or Government agreed that bold moves were needed to close down 
people smuggling routes, to break the business model of the smugglers, to protect [the] 
external borders [of the European Union] and to end the migration crisis in Europe … 
[They] warmly welcomed the additional proposals made today by [the Republic of] 
Turkey to address the migration issue. They agreed to work on the basis of the [following] 
principles: 
–        to return all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into the Greek islands 
with the costs covered by the [European Union]; 
–        to resettle, for every Syrian readmitted by Turkey from Greek islands, another 
Syrian from Turkey to the … Member States [of the European Union], within the 
framework of the existing commitments; 
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–        … 
The President of the European Council will take forward these proposals and work out 
the details with [the Republic of Turkey] before the March European Council. … 
This document does not establish any new commitments on Member States as far as 
relocation and resettlement is concerned. 
…’ 
5        In its Communication COM(2016) 166 final of 16 March 2016 to the European 
Parliament, the European Council and the Council, entitled ‘Next operational steps in EU-
Turkey cooperation in the field of migration’ (‘the communication of 16 March 2016’), 
the European Commission stated that, on 7 March 2016, the ‘[European Union] leaders 
[had] warmly welcomed the additional proposals made by [the Republic of] Turkey and 
[had] agreed to work with Turkey on the basis of a set of six principles’, that ‘the President 
of the European Council [had been] requested to take forward these proposals and work 
out the details with Turkey before the March European Council’ and that ‘this 
Communication [set] out how the six principles should be taken forward, delivering on 
the full potential for [European Union]-[Republic of] Turkey cooperation while 
respecting European and international law’. 
6        In the communication of 16 March 2016, the Commission stated in particular that ‘the 
return of all new irregular migrants and asylum seekers from Greece to Turkey [was] an 
essential component in breaking the pattern of refugees and migrants paying smugglers 
and risking their lives’ and that, ‘given the extent of flows currently between Turkey and 
Greece, such arrangements should be considered as a temporary and extraordinary 
measure which is necessary to end the human suffering and restore public order and which 
needs to be supported with the relevant operational framework’. According to that 
communication, recent progress had been made in the readmission of irregular migrants 
and asylum seekers not in need of international protection to the Republic of Turkey under 
the bilateral Readmission Agreement between the Hellenic Republic and the Republic of 
Turkey, which was to be succeeded, from 1 June 2016, by the Agreement between the 
European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the readmission of persons residing 
without authorisation (OJ 2014 L 134, p. 3). 
7        The Commission concluded, in the communication of 16 March 2016, that the 
‘arrangements for the return of all new irregular migrants and asylum seekers crossing 
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the Aegean Sea from Turkey … [would] be a temporary and extraordinary measure [that] 
should begin as soon as possible’ and that, in that respect, the communication ‘[set] out a 
framework that will ensure that the process is carried out in accordance with international 
and European law, which excludes the application of a “blanket” return policy[, and it] 
also [indicated] the steps, legislative and logistical, that [needed] to be taken as a matter 
of urgency for the process to be launched’. 
 
 The meeting of 18 March 2016 and the EU-Turkey statement 
8        On 18 March 2016, a statement was published on the Council’s website in the form of 
Press Release No 144/16, designed to give an account of the results of ‘the third meeting 
since November 2015 dedicated to deepening Turkey-EU relations as well as addressing 
the migration crisis’ (‘the meeting of 18 March 2016’) between ‘the Members of the 
European Council’ and ‘their Turkish counterpart’ (‘the EU-Turkey statement’). 
9        The EU-Turkey statement provided that, while ‘reconfirm[ing] their commitment to the 
implementation of their joint action plan activated on 29 November 2015[, the Republic 
of] Turkey and the [European Union] recognise[d] that further, swift and determined 
efforts [were] needed’. That statement continued in the following terms: 
‘In order to break the business model of the smugglers and to offer migrants an alternative 
to putting their lives at risk, the EU and [the Republic of] Turkey today decided to end 
the irregular migration from Turkey to the [European Union]. In order to achieve this 
goal, they agreed on the following additional action points: 
(1)      All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands as from 
20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey. This will take place in full accordance with 
[European Union] and international law, thus excluding any kind of collective expulsion. 
All migrants will be protected in accordance with the relevant international standards and 
in respect of the principle of non-refoulement. It will be a temporary and extraordinary 
measure which is necessary to end the human suffering and restore public order. Migrants 
arriving in the Greek islands will be duly registered and any application for asylum will 
be processed individually by the Greek authorities in accordance with the Asylum 
Procedures Directive, in cooperation with UNHCR [the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees]. Migrants not applying for asylum or whose 
application has been found unfounded or inadmissible in accordance with the said 
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directive will be returned to Turkey. [The Republic of] Turkey and [the Hellenic 
Republic], assisted by [European Union] institutions and agencies, will take the necessary 
steps and agree any necessary bilateral arrangements, including the presence of Turkish 
officials on Greek islands and Greek officials in Turkey as from 20 March 2016, to ensure 
liaison and thereby facilitate the smooth functioning of these arrangements. The costs of 
the return operations of irregular migrants will be covered by the EU. 
(2)      For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will 
be resettled from Turkey to the [European Union] taking into account the UN 
Vulnerability Criteria. A mechanism will be established, with the assistance of the 
Commission, [European Union] agencies and other Member States, as well as the 
UNHCR, to ensure that this principle will be implemented as from the same day the 
returns start. Priority will be given to migrants who have not previously entered or tried 
to enter the [European Union] irregularly. On the EU side, resettlement under this 
mechanism will take place, in the first instance, by honouring the commitments taken by 
Member States in the conclusions of Representatives of the Governments of Member 
States meeting within the Council on 20 July 2015, of which 18 000 places for 
resettlement remain. Any further need for resettlement will be carried out through a 
similar voluntary arrangement up to a limit of an additional 54 000 persons. …’ 
  
The applicant’s situation 
10      The applicant, NG, is an Afghan national. He claims to have fled the Islamic Republic 
of Afghanistan with his family because of fear of persecution and serious harm to his 
person. He claims to have been the target and the victim of direct attacks by the Taliban, 
who tried to kill him because of his professional responsibilities in a private company 
having links to the United States of America, committed to carrying out sensitive tasks 
for the benefit of the regular Afghan army. 
11      By his own account, the applicant entered Greece on a date later than 18 March 2016, 
having the intention of introducing an application for asylum in the Federal Republic of 
Germany. 
12      The applicant explains that he submitted his application for asylum in Greece under 
coercion, owing in particular to the existence of the ‘challenged agreement’. However, he 
never wished or had the intention to submit such an application in Greece because of the 
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bad reception conditions in that Member State, particularly in terms of infrastructure, and 
the length of time for the processing of applications for asylum and systematic 
deficiencies in the implementation of the European Asylum System both at the level of 
that Member State’s administration and at the level of its judicial system. These 
deficiencies, he claims, were noted, in particular, by the European Courts in the judgment 
of 21 December 2011, N.S. and Others (C-411/10 and C-493/10, EU:C:2011:865), and in 
the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v. 
Belgium and Greece (CE:ECHR:2011:0121JUD003069609). 
13      Finally, the sole purpose of the applicant’s presentation of his application for asylum in 
Greece was, he claims, to prevent him being returned to Turkey with, as the case may be, 
the risk of being detained there or being expelled to Afghanistan. 
 Procedure and forms of order sought 
14      By application lodged at the Court Registry on 22 April 2016, the applicant brought the 
present action, in which, taking the view that the EU-Turkey statement was an act 
attributable to the European Council establishing an international agreement concluded 
on 18 March 2016 between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey, which he 
describes in his pleadings as the ‘challenged agreement’, he claims that the Court should: 
–        annul the ‘[alleged] agreement between the European Council and [the Republic 
of] Turkey dated 18 March 2016 [and] entitled “EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 
2016”’ (‘the contested measure’); 
–        order the European Council to pay the costs. 
 The expedited procedure and referral of the case to the First Chamber (Extended 
Composition) 
15      By a separate document lodged at the same time as the application, the applicant 
requested that the case be dealt with under the expedited procedure pursuant to 
Article 152 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. 
16      On 10 June 2016, the European Council submitted its observations on the request for an 
expedited procedure, concluding, in essence, that the conditions for applying that 
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procedure were not met. By separate document lodged on the same day, that institution 
requested, principally, referral of the present case to the Grand Chamber pursuant to 
Article 28(1) and (2) of the Rules of Procedure. In the alternative, that institution 
requested referral of the present case to a Chamber sitting with at least five Judges 
pursuant to Article 28(5) of the Rules of Procedure. 
17      By letter of 20 June 2016, the Court Registry acknowledged receipt of the request that 
the present case be referred to the Grand Chamber and informed the parties of its referral, 
pursuant to Article 28(5) of the Rules of Procedure, to an extended Chamber sitting with 
five Judges, in this instance the Seventh Chamber (Extended Composition). 
18      By decision of 22 June 2016, the General Court granted the request for an expedited 
procedure. 
 The plea raised by the European Council and the applications to intervene 
19      By document lodged at the Court Registry on 11 July 2016, the Council raised a plea 
entitled ‘plea of inadmissibility’ pursuant to Article 130 of the Rules of Procedure. 
20      By document lodged at the Court Registry on 19 July 2016, NQ, NR, NS, NT, NU and 
NV sought leave to intervene in support of the form of order sought by the applicant. 
21      By documents lodged on 20 and 22 July 2016 respectively, the Kingdom of Belgium and 
the Hellenic Republic sought leave to intervene in support of the form of order sought by 
the European Council. 
22      By document lodged on 3 August 2016, the Commission sought leave to intervene in 
support of the form of order sought by the ‘Council of the European Union’. By letter of 
amendment of 11 August 2016, the Commission indicated that it intended to intervene in 
support of the form of order sought by the ‘European Council’. 
23      By document lodged on 15 August 2016, Amnesty International sought leave to 
intervene in support of the form of order sought by the applicant. 
24      In its plea, the European Council formally requests the Court to: 
–        dismiss the action as ‘manifestly inadmissible’; 
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2018 
74 
 
–        order the applicant to pay the costs. 
25      On 3 August 2016, the applicant submitted his observations on the plea raised by the 
European Council, in which he claims that the Court should: 
–        dismiss that plea; 
–        declare the action admissible; 
–        order the European Council to pay the costs which he has incurred in the context 
of the preliminary issue relating to admissibility. 
26      By letter from the Registry of 3 October 2016, the parties were informed that a new 
Judge-Rapporteur had been designated and that the present case had been reassigned to 
the First Chamber (Extended Composition), in which that Judge sits. 
 The replies to the measures of organisation of procedure 
27      By letters from the Registry of 3 November 2016, the European Council was invited to 
comply with measures of organisation of procedure adopted by the Court pursuant to 
Article 89(3)(a) and (d) and Article 90(1) of the Rules of Procedure, while the Council 
and the Commission were, for their part, invited by the Court to reply to certain questions 
and to provide certain documents pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 24 of the 
Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 89(3)(c) of the Rules of 
Procedure. In that context, those institutions were asked, in particular, to inform the Court 
whether the meeting of 18 March 2016 had led to a written agreement and, if so, to send 
it any documents enabling the identification of the parties that had agreed the ‘additional 
action points’ referred to in the EU-Turkey statement. 
28      In its replies of 18 November 2016 to the Court’s questions, the European Council 
explained, inter alia, that, to the best of its knowledge, no agreement or treaty in the sense 
of Article 218 TFEU or Article 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties 
of 23 May 1969 had been concluded between the European Union and the Republic of 
Turkey. The EU-Turkey statement, as published by means of Press Release No 144/16, 
was, it submitted, merely ‘the fruit of an international dialogue between the Member 
States and [the Republic of] Turkey and — in the light of its content and of the intention 
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of its authors — [was] not intended to produce legally binding effects nor constitute an 
agreement or a treaty’. 
29      The European Council also provided a number of documents relating to the meeting of 
18 March 2016 which constituted, according to that institution, a meeting of the Heads of 
State or Government of the Member States of the European Union with the representative 
of the Republic of Turkey, and not a meeting of the European Council in which that third 
country had participated. 
30      In its reply of 18 November 2016, the Commission informed the Court, inter alia, that it 
was clear from the vocabulary used in the EU-Turkey statement, in particular the use of 
the word ‘will’ in the English version, that it was not a legally binding agreement but a 
political arrangement reached by the ‘Members of the European Council, [that is to say,] 
the Heads of State or Government of the Member States, the President of the European 
Council and the President of the Commission’, which had been recounted in its entirety 
in the body of Press Release No 144/16 relating to the meeting of 18 March 2016 and 
setting out the EU-Turkey statement. 
31      In its reply of 2 December 2016, the Council explained, inter alia, that it was not the 
author of the EU-Turkey statement and that it had not been in any way involved in the 
structured dialogue that took place between the representatives of the Member States and 
the Republic of Turkey or in the activities of the President of the European Council 
leading to that statement. The preparatory work that took place within the Permanent 
Representatives Committee (Coreper) concerned only the preparation of meetings of the 
European Council, some of which concerned the management of the migration crisis. By 
contrast, the Council had not prepared the summit held on 18 March 2016 between the 
Members of the European Council, who are the Heads of State or Government of the 
Member States of the European Union, and the Turkish Prime Minister. 
32      The Council indicated, moreover, that it fully shares the position developed by the 
European Council in its plea made pursuant to Article 130 of the Rules of Procedure. In 
that regard, it claimed in particular that, to the best of its knowledge, no agreement or 
treaty had been concluded between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey in 
connection with the migration crisis. 
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33      In his observations lodged on 19 December 2016, the applicant contested the position of 
the European Council, the Council and the Commission according to which, first, no 
agreement had been concluded with the Republic of Turkey during the meeting of 
18 March 2016 and, secondly, that the outcome of the discussions with that third country 
had to be classified as a political arrangement. In particular, the applicant is of the view 
that, taking into account the language used in what he describes as the ‘challenged 
agreement’, the use of the English word ‘agree’ shows that it is an agreement intended to 
produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. Furthermore, he submits, the absence of the 
term ‘Member States’ indicates that the ‘challenged agreement’ could not have been 
concluded by the Member States of the European Union. 
 Law 
34      Pursuant to Article 130 of the Rules of Procedure, where, by separate document, the 
defendant applies to the Court for a decision on inadmissibility or lack of competence 
without going to the substance of the case, the Court must decide on the application as 
soon as possible, where necessary after opening the oral part of the procedure. 
35      In the present case, the Court considers that it has sufficient information from the 
documents before it and decides to give its decision without any need to propose to the 
plenum that the present case be referred to the Grand Chamber or to open the oral 
procedure. 
36      In the context of the plea which it raises, the European Council alleges, principally, that 
the Court has no jurisdiction to rule on the present action. 
37      It being understood that the rules on the jurisdiction of the Courts of the European Union, 
as laid down by the FEU Treaty and also by the Statute of the Court of Justice and the 
annex thereto, form part of primary law and are central to the European Union’s legal 
order and that, therefore, respect for those rules constitutes a fundamental requirement in 
that legal order (judgment of 10 September 2015, Review Missir Mamachi di 
Lusignano v Commission, C-417/14 RX-II, EU:C:2015:588, paragraph 57), the Court 
must first of all examine that question. 
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38      In support of its plea of lack of jurisdiction, the European Council contends that neither 
it nor any of the entities referred to in the first paragraph of Article 263 TFEU is the author 
of the EU-Turkey statement, as published by the Council by means of Press Release 
No 144/16, with the result that it cannot properly be designated as being the defendant in 
the present case. 
39      According to the European Council, the EU-Turkey statement was issued by the 
participants in an international summit held, in this instance, on 18 March 2016 in the 
margins of and following the meeting of the European Council. Therefore, that statement 
is attributable to the Members of the European Council, which are the Member States of 
the European Union, and their ‘Turkish counterpart’, since they met in the context of a 
meeting distinct from that of the European Council. That distinct meeting followed the 
first two meetings of the Heads of State or Government, of the same type, which had 
taken place on 29 November 2015 and 7 March 2016 and had resulted in the publication 
of either a joint statement, such as that at issue in the present case as set out in Press 
Release No 144/16, or a joint action plan. The European Council contends that the EU-
Turkey statement cannot therefore be classified as a measure adopted by it. 
40      The applicant opposes that analysis by claiming that what he describes as the ‘challenged 
agreement’, as a contested measure, having regard to its content and all of the 
circumstances surrounding its adoption, must be regarded as a measure of the European 
Council because, in the present case, contrary to what that institution claims, the Member 
States of the European Union acted collectively within that institution and did not exercise 
national competences outside the institutional framework of the European Union. 
Furthermore, the applicant maintains that the European Council and the Commission 
actively participated in the preparation and negotiation of that ‘challenged agreement’, as 
is shown, in that respect, by the content of the communication of 16 March 2016, and that 
that ‘challenged agreement’ is in fact an international agreement. 
41      The applicant disputes the contention that the European Council may, on the one hand, 
assert that the members of that institution acted, in this case, in their capacity as 
representatives of their governments or States and, on the other hand, assert that the 
Member States were thus able to act in the name of the European Union by binding it to 
a third country by what he describes as the ‘challenged agreement’, which, moreover, is 
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contrary to the standards laid down by the applicable secondary European Union law on 
asylum. 
42      In any event, he submits, reference must be made to the terms used in the EU-Turkey 
statement as published by means of Press Release No 144/16, in particular the fact that it, 
first, refers to the fact that the ‘EU’ and the Republic of Turkey ‘agreed’ on certain 
additional action points, ‘decided’ and ‘reconfirmed’ certain aspects and, secondly, states 
the specific obligations accepted by each of the parties, which, in his view, corroborates 
the existence of a legally binding agreement. Furthermore, concerning the Commission’s 
explanations relating to the existence of a legislative and regulatory framework already 
enabling the financing of return operations, which was an additional action point referred 
to in the EU-Turkey statement, this, in the applicant’s view, suggests that what he 
describes as the ‘challenged agreement’ was concluded in a context enabling its 
implementation, which reinforces the capacity of that ‘challenged agreement’ to produce 
legal effects. 
 Preliminary considerations 
43      As a preliminary point, it should be remembered that the action for annulment laid down 
in Article 263 TFEU must be available in the case of all measures adopted by the 
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, whatever their nature or form, 
provided that they are intended to produce legal effects (judgments of 31 March 
1971, Commission v Council, 22/70, EU:C:1971:32, paragraph 42, and of 4 September 
2014, Commission v Council, C-114/12, EU:C:2014:2151, paragraphs 38 and 39; see, 
also, judgment of 28 April 2015, Commission v Council, C-28/12, EU:C:2015:282, 
paragraphs 14 and 15 and the case-law cited). In this regard, the fact that the existence of 
a measure intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties was revealed by means 
of a press release or that it took the form of a statement does not preclude the possibility 
of finding that such a measure exists or, therefore, the jurisdiction of the European Union 
Courts to review the legality of such a measure pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, provided 
that it emanates from an institution, body, office or agency of the European Union (see, 
to that effect, judgment of 30 June 1993, Parliament v Council and Commission, 
C-181/91 and C-248/91, EU:C:1993:271, paragraph 14). 
44      With regard to the European Council, the Lisbon Treaty established that body as an 
institution of the European Union. Thus, contrary to what had been found previously by 
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the European Union Courts (orders of 13 January 1995, Roujansky v Council, 
C-253/94 P, EU:C:1995:4, paragraph 11, and of 13 January 1995, Bonnamy v Council, 
C-264/94 P, EU:C:1995:5, paragraph 11), the measures adopted by that institution, 
which, according to Article 15 TEU, does not exercise legislative functions and consists 
of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States, together with its President 
and the President of the Commission, no longer escape the review of legality provided 
for in Article 263 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 November 2012, Pringle, 
C-370/12, EU:C:2012:756, paragraphs 30 to 37). 
45      However, it follows from Article 263 TFEU that, generally, the European Union Courts 
have no jurisdiction to rule on the lawfulness of a measure adopted by a national authority 
(judgments of 3 December 1992, Oleificio Borelli v Commission, C-97/91, 
EU:C:1992:491, paragraph 9, and of 15 December 1999, Kesko v Commission, T-22/97, 
EU:T:1999:327, paragraph 83) or of a measure adopted by the representatives of the 
national authorities of several Member States acting in the framework of a committee 
provided for in a European Union regulation (see, to that effect, judgment of 
17 September 2014, Liivimaa Lihaveis, C-562/12, EU:C:2014:2229, paragraph 51). In 
the same way, measures adopted by the representatives of the Member States physically 
gathered in the grounds of one of the European Union institutions and acting, not in their 
capacity as members of the Council or European Council, but in their capacity as Heads 
of State or Government of the Member States of the European Union, are not subject to 
judicial review by the European Union Courts (judgment of 30 June 
1993, Parliament v Council and Commission, C-181/91 and C-248/91, EU:C:1993:271, 
paragraph 12). 
46      However, it does not suffice, in this regard, that a measure is classified, by an institution 
featuring as the defendant in an action, as a ‘decision of the Member States’ of the 
European Union in order for such a measure to escape the review of legality established 
by Article 263 TFEU, in the present case, measures of the European Council. In order for 
such a measure to be excluded from review, it is still necessary to determine whether, 
having regard to its content and all the circumstances in which it was adopted, the measure 
in question is not in reality a decision of the European Council (judgment of 30 June 
1993, Parliament v Council and Commission, C-181/91 and C-248/91, EU:C:1993:271, 
paragraph 14). 
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 The authors of the contested measure 
47      Those clarifications having been made, the Court finds that, in the present case, the 
contested measure is formally described in the application as being the ‘agreement 
entered into by the European Council dated 18 March 2016 with [the Republic of] Turkey 
entitled “EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016”’, namely, a measure governed by 
international treaty law. However, concerning the review of legality by the European 
Union Courts of measures relating to international treaty law, this can concern only the 
measure by which an institution sought to conclude the international agreement at issue, 
and not the latter as such (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 September 2008, Kadi and Al 
Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C-402/05 P and 
C-415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraph 286). The form of order sought by the applicant 
must therefore be understood as seeking, in essence, the annulment of a measure by which 
the European Council sought to conclude, on behalf of the European Union, an agreement 
with the Republic of Turkey on 18 March 2016 (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 August 
1994, France v Commission, C-327/91, EU:C:1994:305, paragraph 17), the content of 
which was set out in the EU-Turkey statement as published by means of Press Release 
No 144/16. 
48      Consequently, it is for the Court to assess whether the EU-Turkey statement, as published 
by means of that press release, reveals the existence of a measure attributable to the 
institution concerned in the present case, namely, the European Council, and whether, by 
that measure, that institution concluded an international agreement, which the applicant 
describes as the ‘challenged agreement’, adopted in disregard of Article 218 TFEU and 
corresponding to the contested measure. 
49      To the extent that, for the purposes of the first paragraph of Article 21 of the Statute of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union, the contested measure was given form by the 
applicant through the production of Press Release No 144/16, the circumstances in which 
the EU-Turkey statement, as published by that press release, was adopted and the content 
of that statement must be examined in order to determine whether it may constitute or 
reveal the existence of a measure attributable to the European Council and, thus, falling 
under the review of legality laid down in Article 263 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment 
of 30 June 1993, Parliament v Council and Commission, C-181/91 and C-248/91, 
EU:C:1993:271, paragraph 14), in the present case a measure that corresponds to the 
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contested measure and concludes what the applicant describes as the ‘challenged 
agreement’. 
50      As mentioned in the EU-Turkey statement, the meeting of 18 March 2016 was the third 
meeting to occur since November 2015. However, as regards the two previous meetings, 
which took place, respectively, on 29 November 2015 and 7 March 2016, the 
representatives of the Member States participated in those meetings in their capacity as 
Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the European Union and not as 
Members of the European Council. 
51      As regards the first meeting of the Heads of State or Government, this gave rise to a press 
release, entitled ‘Meeting of [European Union] Heads of State or Government with [the 
Republic of] Turkey — EU-Turkey statement, 29 [November] 2015’, in which it was 
stated that it was the ‘Leaders of the European Union’ who had met with their ‘Turkish 
counterpart’. 
52      As regards the second meeting of the Heads of State or Government, it gave rise to a 
press release, entitled ‘Statement of the [European Union] Heads of State or 
Government’, in which it was stated that it was the ‘[European Union] Heads of State or 
Government’ who had met with the Turkish Prime Minister and that ‘they [had] agreed 
… on the basis of the principles … contain[ed] [in the additional proposals made on 
7 March 2016 by the Republic of Turkey]: to return all new irregular migrants [who 
crossed] from Turkey into the Greek islands with the costs covered by the [European 
Union]; to resettle, for every Syrian readmitted by [the Republic of] Turkey from Greek 
islands, another Syrian from Turkey to the Member States of the European Union, within 
the framework of the existing commitments’. 
53      In that context, the Commission’s communication of 16 March 2016 was released, which 
cannot be regarded as a proposal within the meaning of Article 294(2) TFEU (see, to that 
effect, judgment of 30 June 1993, Parliament v Council and Commission, C-181/91 and 
C-248/91, EU:C:1993:271, paragraphs 17 and 18). That communication indicates that the 
‘new phase in EU-Turkey cooperation to tackle the migration crisis will require concerted 
efforts from [the Hellenic Republic] and [the Republic of] Turkey, supported by the 
Commission, [European Union] agencies and partner organisations’ and that ‘it will also 
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require the support of Member States, both in terms of the provision of personnel and the 
willingness to make pledges for resettlement’. 
54      However, the EU-Turkey statement, as published following the meeting of 18 March 
2016 by means of Press Release No 144/16, differs in its presentation in comparison with 
the previous statements published following the first and second meetings of the Heads 
of State or Government. 
55      Press Release No 144/16 relating to the meeting of 18 March 2016 states, first, that the 
EU-Turkey statement is the result of a meeting between the ‘Members of the European 
Council’ and their ‘Turkish counterpart’; secondly, that it was the ‘Members of the 
European Council’ who met with their Turkish counterpart and, thirdly, that it was ‘the 
EU and [the Republic of] Turkey’ which agreed on the additional action points set out in 
that statement. It is therefore necessary to determine whether the use of those terms 
implies, as the applicant submits, that the representatives of the Member States 
participated in the meeting of 18 March 2016 in their capacity as members of the 
‘European Council’ institution or that they participated in that meeting in their capacity 
as Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the European Union. 
56      In this regard, the Court notes that, although Press Release No 144/16, by which the EU-
Turkey statement was published, includes, in its online version provided by the applicant 
as an annex to the application, the indication ‘Foreign affairs and international relations’, 
which relates in principle to the work of the European Council, the PDF version of that 
press release provided by the European Council, for its part, bears the heading 
‘International Summit’, which relates in principle to the meetings of the Heads of State 
or Government of the Member States of the European Union with the representatives of 
third countries. Consequently, no conclusion can be drawn regarding the presence of 
those indications. 
57      Next, with regard to the content of the EU-Turkey statement, the use of the expression 
‘Members of the European Council’ and the indication that it was the European Union 
which agreed on the additional action points with the Republic of Turkey could, 
admittedly, imply that the representatives of the Member States of the European Union 
had acted, during the meeting of 18 March 2016, in their capacity as members of the 
‘European Council’ institution and had, notwithstanding that institution’s lack of 
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2018 
83 
 
legislative competence, as expressly mentioned in Article 15(1) TEU, decided to 
conclude legally an agreement with that third country outside of the procedure laid down 
in Article 218 TFEU. 
58      However, in its reply of 18 November 2016, the European Council explained that the 
expression ‘Members of the European Council’ contained in the EU-Turkey statement 
must be understood as a reference to the Heads of State or Government of the Member 
States of the European Union, since they make up the European Council. Furthermore, 
the reference in that statement to the fact that ‘the EU and [the Republic of] Turkey’ had 
agreed on certain additional action points is explained by the emphasis on simplification 
of the words used for the general public in the context of a press release. 
59      According to that institution, the term ‘EU’ must be understood in this journalistic 
context as referring to the Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the 
European Union. In this regard, the European Council insisted on the form in which the 
EU-Turkey statement at issue in the present case was published, namely, that of a press 
release which, by its nature, serves only an informative purpose and has no legal value. 
The defendant stresses that this informative support is produced by the press office of the 
General Secretariat of the Council in order to address the general public. This explains, 
first, the affixing, in certain documents published on the internet, such as the online 
version of Press Release No 144/16 relating to the EU-Turkey statement provided by the 
applicant, of a double header ‘European Council/Council of the European Union’, and, 
secondly, the fact that some documents are occasionally inadvertently placed under 
inappropriate sections of the internet site shared by those two institutions and the 
President of the European Council. 
60      On account of the target audience of such informative support, the press release in which 
the EU-Turkey statement had been set out intentionally used simplified wording, plain 
language and shorthand. However, this popularisation of words cannot be used to proceed 
with legal and regulatory assessments and, in particular, cannot alter the content or the 
legal nature of the procedure to which it relates, namely, an international summit, as the 
PDF version of the press release relating to the EU-Turkey statement indicates. 
61      Thus, according to the European Council, the inappropriate use of the expression 
‘Members of the European Council’ and the term ‘EU’ in a press release, such as Press 
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Release No 144/16 setting out the EU-Turkey statement, cannot in any way affect the 
legal status and the role in which the representatives of the Member States met with their 
Turkish counterpart, in the present case in their capacity as Heads of State or Government, 
and cannot bind the European Union in any way. The EU-Turkey statement, as published 
by Press Release No 144/16, is in reality, it submits, merely a political commitment of 
the Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the European Union vis-à-vis 
their Turkish counterpart. 
62      In regard to these explanations of the European Council and taking into account the 
ambivalence of the expression ‘Members of the European Council’ and the term ‘EU’ in 
the EU-Turkey statement, as published by Press Release No 144/16, reference must be 
made to the documents relating to the meeting of 18 March 2016 in order to determine 
their scope. 
63      In this regard, the Court finds that the official documents relating to the meeting of 
18 March 2016, provided by the European Council at the Court’s request, show that two 
separate events, that is to say, the meeting of that institution and an international summit, 
were organised in parallel in distinct ways from a legal, formal and organisational 
perspective, confirming the distinct legal nature of those two events. 
64      First, in its replies of 18 November 2016 to the Court’s questions, the European Council 
explained, by producing the various items of press material published by it, that the 
meeting of the European Council was initially intended to extend over two days but that, 
taking intervening migratory events into account, it had been decided to dedicate no more 
than a single day to that meeting, namely, 17 March 2016, and to replace the second day 
of the initially envisaged meeting of the European Council, namely, 18 March 2016, by 
a meeting between the Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the 
European Union and their Turkish counterpart, a meeting which, for reasons of costs, 
security and efficiency, had taken place in the same building as that used for the meetings 
of the European Council and those of the Council. 
65      Secondly, it follows in particular from the invitation sent on 9 March 2016 by the 
President of the European Council to the different Member States of the European Union 
that the ‘Members of the European Council’ were invited on 17 March 2016 to a meeting 
of the European Council, the work of which was scheduled from 16:45 to 19:30 and was 
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followed by a dinner, while, as regards 18 March 2016, the arrival of the ‘[European 
Union] Heads of State or Government and the Head of Government of Turkey’ was 
scheduled between 9:15 and 9:45 and followed by a ‘working lunch for the … Heads of 
State or Government [of the European Union] and the Head of Government of Turkey’ at 
10:00. A note of 11 March 2016 sent by the General Secretariat of the Council to the 
Mission of the Republic of Turkey to the European Union describes, in the same terms, 
the course of the meeting of 18 March 2016 by inviting the Turkish Prime Minister to a 
meeting with the Heads of State or Government of the European Union and not with the 
Members of the European Council. 
66      Furthermore, a note of 18 March 2016 of the Directorate for Protocol and Meetings of 
the Directorate-General ‘Administration’ of the Council, entitled ‘Working Programme 
of the Protocol service’, indicates, for its part, as regards the meeting of 18 March 2016, 
that the arrival of the ‘Members of the European Council, the Prime Minister of the 
Republic of Turkey and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy’ would take place without protocol order between 12:00 and 12:45 and 
that a ‘working lunch for Members of the European Council and High Representative’ 
would be offered from 13:00, with no mention of the Turkish Prime Minister’s presence. 
By contrast, that note, produced by the service in charge of protocol, invited the 
participants to a ‘working session of the … Heads of State and Government and High 
Representative [of the European Union] with Prime Minister of Turkey’ scheduled to 
begin at 15:00, corroborating the fact that it was in that latter capacity, and not in their 
capacity as Members of the European Council, that the representatives of the Member 
States of the European Union were invited to meet their Turkish counterpart. 
67      Those documents, officially sent to the Member States of the European Union and the 
Republic of Turkey, thus establish that, notwithstanding the regrettably ambiguous terms 
of the EU-Turkey statement, as published by means of Press Release No 144/16, it was 
in their capacity as Heads of State or Government of the Member States that the 
representatives of those Member States met with the Turkish Prime Minister on 18 March 
2016 in the premises shared by the European Council and the Council, namely, the Justus 
Lipsius building. 
68      In this regard, the fact that the President of the European Council and the President of 
the Commission, not formally invited, had also been present during that meeting cannot 
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allow the conclusion that, because of the presence of all those Members of the European 
Council, the meeting of 18 March 2016 took place between the European Council and the 
Turkish Prime Minister. 
69      Referring to several documents produced by its President, the European Council 
indicated that, in practice, the Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the 
European Union conferred upon him a task of representation and coordination of 
negotiations with the Republic of Turkey in their name, which explains his presence 
during the meeting of 18 March 2016. Likewise, the presence of the President of the 
Commission in that meeting is explained by the fact that that meeting was a continuation 
of the political dialogue with the Republic of Turkey initiated by the Commission in 
October 2015 at the invitation of the Heads of State or Government of the European Union 
made on 23 September 2015. As the European Council correctly points out, those 
documents refer explicitly and repeatedly, as regards the work of 18 March 2016, to a 
meeting of the Heads of State or Government of the European Union with their Turkish 
counterpart, and not to a meeting of the European Council. That is in particular the case 
with regard to statement No 151/16 of the President of the European Council, 
communicated immediately after the meeting of 18 March 2016, entitled ‘Remarks by 
President Donald Tusk after the meeting of … Heads of State or Government [of the 
European Union] with Turkey’. 
70      In those circumstances, the Court finds that the expression ‘Members of the European 
Council’ and the term ‘EU’, contained in the EU-Turkey statement as published by means 
of Press Release No 144/16, must be understood as references to the Heads of State or 
Government of the European Union who, as during the first and second meetings of the 
Heads of State or Government on 29 November 2015 and 7 March 2016, met with their 
Turkish counterpart and agreed on operational measures with a view to restoring public 
order, essentially on Greek territory, that correspond to those already mentioned or stated 
previously in the statements published in the form of press releases following the first and 
second meetings of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the 
European Union with their Turkish counterpart. This is corroborated by the fact that the 
statement adopted following the second meeting of the Heads of State or Government, 
held on 29 November 2015, equally and invariably used the term ‘EU’ and the expression 
‘European leaders’ to designate the representatives of the Member States of the European 
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Union, acting in their capacity as Heads of State or Government of those Member States, 
during that meeting of 29 November 2015, in a similar way to that of 18 March 2016. 
71      It is clear from that overall context preceding the online publication on the Council’s 
website of Press Release No 144/16 setting out the EU-Turkey statement that, concerning 
the management of the migration crisis, the European Council, as an institution, did not 
adopt a decision to conclude an agreement with the Turkish Government in the name of 
the European Union and that it also did not commit the European Union within the 
meaning of Article 218 TFEU. Consequently, the European Council did not adopt any 
measure that corresponds to the contested measure, as described by the applicant and of 
which the content was allegedly set out in that press release. 
72      It follows from all of the foregoing considerations that, independently of whether it 
constitutes, as maintained by the European Council, the Council and the Commission, a 
political statement or, on the contrary, as the applicant submits, a measure capable of 
producing binding legal effects, the EU-Turkey statement, as published by means of Press 
Release No 144/16, cannot be regarded as a measure adopted by the European Council, 
or, moreover, by any other institution, body, office or agency of the European Union, or 
as revealing the existence of such a measure that corresponds to the contested measure. 
73      For the sake of completeness, with regard to the reference in the EU-Turkey statement 
to the fact that ‘the EU and [the Republic of] Turkey agreed on … additional action 
points’, the Court considers that, even supposing that an international agreement could 
have been informally concluded during the meeting of 18 March 2016, which has been 
denied by the European Council, the Council and the Commission in the present case, 
that agreement would have been an agreement concluded by the Heads of State or 
Government of the Member States of the European Union and the Turkish Prime 
Minister. 
74      However, in an action brought under Article 263 TFEU, the Court does not have 
jurisdiction to rule on the lawfulness of an international agreement concluded by the 
Member States (judgment of 5 May 2015, Spain v Parliament and Council, C-146/13, 
EU:C:2015:298, paragraph 101). 
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75      Accordingly, the plea of lack of jurisdiction raised by the European Council must be 
upheld, bearing in mind that Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union is not intended to change the system of judicial review laid down by the 
Treaties (judgment of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament 
and Council, C-583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraph 97). 
76      As the plea of lack of jurisdiction has been upheld and the action must, accordingly, be 
dismissed, there is no longer any need to rule on the applications for leave to intervene 
submitted by NQ, NR, NS, NT, NU and NV, by Amnesty International, and by the 
Kingdom of Belgium, the Hellenic Republic and the Commission. 
 Costs 
77      Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered 
to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. However, 
pursuant to Article 135(1) of those rules, the General Court may, if equity so requires, 
decide that an unsuccessful party is to bear his own costs, but is to pay only part of the 
costs incurred by the other party, or even that he is not to be ordered to pay any costs. 
78      In view of the circumstances of the present case, in particular the ambiguous wording of 
Press Release No 144/16, the Court deems it fair to decide that each party is to bear its 
own costs. 
79      Under Article 144(10) of the Rules of Procedure, if the proceedings in the main case are 
concluded before the application for leave to intervene has been decided upon, the 
applicant to intervene and the main parties must each bear their own costs relating to the 
application for leave to intervene. Consequently, NG, the European Council, NQ, NR, 
NS, NT, NU and NV, Amnesty International, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Hellenic 
Republic and the Commission must bear their own costs relating to the applications for 
leave to intervene. 
On those grounds, 
THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber, Extended Composition) 
hereby orders: 
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2018 
89 
 
1.      The action is dismissed on the ground of the Court’s lack of jurisdiction to hear 
and determine it. 
2.      There is no need to rule on the applications for leave to intervene submitted by 
NQ, NR, NS, NT, NU and NV, Amnesty International, the Kingdom of 
Belgium, the Hellenic Republic and the European Commission. 
3.      NG and the European Council shall bear their own costs. 
4.      NQ, NR, NS, NT, NU and NV, Amnesty International, the Kingdom of 
Belgium, the Hellenic Republic and the Commission shall bear their own costs. 
 
Luxembourg, 28 February 2017. 
E. Coulon         I. Pelikánová 
Registrar         President 
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